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"It is generally agreed that it is true, in the purely technical
field, a considerable measure of power can be exercised by, and
indeed must be granted to, a world body."'
I. Introduction
Law without compliance and enforcement is like poetry - it is
pleasing to the ear, but has little to do with the practical world in
which we live.2 The study of efforts to achieve uniformity in
international norms and compliance with international legal
obligations reveals mixed success, even in areas where there is
I Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference (Nov. I -Dec.7, 1944);
R.I.R. Abeyratne, Some Recommendations for a New Legal and Regulatory Structure for
the Management of the Offense of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation, 25 TRANSP.
L.J. 115, 141 (1998).
2 Professor John Norton Moore put it more eloquently:
For the rule of law is not simply normative systems and broad acceptance of the
authoritativeness of such laws. Rather, it is such systems coupled with patterns
of community compliance. And sadly, while many modem normative systems
have patterns of high community compliance, others still have failure rates with
catastrophic consequences for human dignity and progress. Surely, the greatest
weakness of the contemporary international system is not the absence of
authoritative norms, or underlying intellectual understanding about the need for
such norms, but rather the all-too-frequent absence of compliance.
John Norton Moore, Enhancing Compliance With International Law: A Neglected
Remedy, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 881, 884 (1999). Professor Dr. Michael Milde also put it
well, writing that, "without enforcement law tends to lose its binding nature and
degenerates into a pious statement of principles detached from the reality." Michael
Milde, Enforcement of Aviation Safety Standards - Problems of Safety Oversight, 45
GER. J. AR& SPACE L. 3, 15 (1996).
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widespread consensus for the need to have international harmony.
Given the inherent sovereignty of states, the heterogeneous levels
of economic ability, and the diversity of political priorities,
securing compliance with international obligations is rarely an
effortless task.3 This article addresses legal norms governing
international aviation safety, as well as both unilateral and
multilateral efforts to achieve state compliance with those
international legal obligations.
Commercial international aviation provides a useful case study
of how the world community seeks to achieve mutual self-interest
by securing global harmony in law. The interplay between
conventional international law, quasi-legal standards promulgated
by international organizations, and national laws, regulations, and
procedures offers insights as to how complex international
enterprises, such as commercial aviation, play on the world stage.
In 1944, the world community acknowledged the need to
achieve safety in international aviation through uniformity in law4
by establishing an organization to govern international aviation,
conferring upon it quasi-legislative power to prescribe standards
governing international aviation safety, and obliging member
states to implement these standards through their domestic laws
Despite the efforts of major aviation nations and international
organizations, those goals are only sluggishly being achieved.
Thus, aviation safety can serve as a case study to inquire into the
ability and willingness, on the one hand, or inability and
unwillingness, on the other, of states to conform to their
international obligations and the means by which they can be
encouraged, or coerced, to comply.
This inquiry is important for another less theoretical and more
3 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Compliance and Enforcement in International Law -
Oil Pollution of the Marine Environment by Ocean Vessels, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
459, 485 (1984) [hereinafter Dempsey, Compliance and Enforcement in International
Law].
4 As Professor Dr. Michael Milde observed, "[c]ivil aviation could not have
evolved without world wide uniformity in regulations, standards and procedures in
relation of air navigation." Milde, supra note 2, at 4.
5 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Role of the International Civil Aviation
Organization on Deregulation, Discrimination & Dispute Resolution, 52 J. AIR L. &
COM. 529, 533 (1987) [hereinafter Dempsey, The Role of the International Civil Aviation
Organization].
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practical reason. Safety and security are two sides of the same
coin. The regulation of both is designed to avoid injuries to
persons and property, and the deprivation of man's most valuable
attribute - life. Yet the two are quite different, as well. Safety
regulation focuses on preventing accidental harm. Security
regulation focuses on preventing intentional harm. Like the
common law difference between fault-based negligence and
intentional torts, the latter involves more culpability than the
former, and is deterred by more serious penalties. Since the tragic
events of September 11, 2001, security has become a paramount
concern in international aviation community.6 Yet a passenger is
ten times more likely to lose his life in an aviation safety-related
accident than in an aviation terrorist event.7 Hence, the study of
aviation safety is of far more practical importance than the more
emotionally driven study of aviation security. Safety must be
among the highest priorities in commercial aviation.8
All statistical evidence indicates that international aviation has
become decidedly safer in recent decades.9 Though much of that
positive result can be attributed to improvements in technology,
much can also be attributed to improvements in the law. It is the
latter subject that is the focus of this article.
This article will attempt to answer the following questions:
1. What are the means by which legal obligations in the
area of aviation safety have become binding upon
states?
2. What are the substantive conventional international laws
and standards governing international aviation safety?
6 See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War
Against Terrorism, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649, 656 (2003). [hereinafter Dempsey,
Aviation Security].
7 John Saba, Worldwide Safe Flight: Will the International Financial Facility for
Aviation Safety Help It Happen? 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 537, 538 (2003).
8 The Honorable L. Welch Pogue, U.S. delegate to the Chicago Conference of
1944 and Chairman of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, observed that "safety should be
the preoccupation of everyone involved in the operation of an airline [including) those
engaged in manufacturing airline replacement parts and supplies, and... all employees
of governments engaged in the oversight or the regulation of airlines." L. Welch Pogue,
Personal Recollections from the Chicago Conference: ICAO, Then, Now, and in the
Future, 20 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 35, 42 (1995).
9 Saba, supra note 7, at 655.
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3. What has been the level of national compliance with and
implementation of such laws and standards?
4. What means have been employed, unilaterally and
multilaterally, by which compliance has been monitored
and encouraged or sanctions for noncompliance
imposed?
Any chronological review of the development of international
aviation law must begin with the "Constitution" of international
civil aviation, the Chicago Convention of 1944 (Chicago
Convention).'° This multilateral agreement created the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)" and gave it
quasi-legislative authority to promulgate standards and
recommended practices (SARPs) as Annexes to the Chicago
Convention. 2 These standards are arguably binding upon member
states that fail to notify ICAO of the differences in their domestic
law.'3
10 Convention of International Civil Aviation, art. 1, 61 stat. 1180 15 U.N.T.S. 185
(1944), reprinted in 18 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE L. 5 (1993) [hereinafter Chicago
Convention].
II ICAO is composed of 188 contracting states, and thereby encompasses virtually
the entire civil aviation community. The basic aims and objectives of ICAO are to
ensure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world
and to promote the safety of flight in international air navigation. See Assad Kotaite,
Security of International Civil Aviation-Role ofICAO, 7 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 95
(1982) (discussing the role of ICAO in the international aviation community).
12 Abeyratne, supra note 1, at 146-47.
13 "Standards" are mandatory, and usually include the verb "shall" or "will." At
the first ICAO Assembly, the standards were defined as "any specification ... the
uniform application of which is recognized as necessary for the safety or regularity of
international air navigation and to which Contracting States will conform... ; in the
event of impossibility of compliance, notification to the Council is compulsory under
Article 38 of the Convention." ICAO Ass. Res. A1-31. In contrast, a "recommended
practice" only has advisory or recommendatory connotations and includes the verb
"shall." Abeyrante, supra note 1, at 144. ICAO also issues Procedures for Air
Navigation Services (PANS) and Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS). Id.
These involve procedures that have not yet reached a sufficient degree of maturity for
adoption as SARPs or contain material of a more permanent character that would
warrant adoption of it as an Annex. Id. Another form of rulemaking that has been
employed by the Council are the Technical Instructions, which provide detailed
explanations of how Annexes are to be implemented. Id. ICAO was also given quasi-
judicial power to adjudicate disputes between states over the Chicago Convention. See
Dempsey, The Role of the International Civil Aviation Organization, supra note 5, at
561.
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Next, this article will examine unilateral and multilateral
efforts to facilitate conformity with international legal obligations
in the realm of aviation safety. It will then turn to a substantive
review of the international and domestic aviation safety
requirements, focusing on the requirements as set forth in the
Chicago Convention and its Annexes, the U.S. model Civil
Aviation Safety Act (CASA), and U.S. domestic law. Finally, this
article will examine the propriety and efficacy of those activities
under general theories of international relations and principles of
international law.
II. The Development of International Aviation Safety Law
A. The Conventional Law of International Civil Aviation
As World War II entered its final stages, several prominent
members of the international community expressed concern over
the postwar development of international civil aviation.14 They
realized that this brave new world would require multilaterally
negotiated solutions to a growing number of political, economic
and technical problems. 5 In response to these concerns, the
United States hosted an international conference in the hope that it
would lay the foundation for the future growth of the industry.16
Fifty-two nations attended the International Civil Aviation
Conference in Chicago in November of 1944."7 The initial
optimism for creating a comprehensive agreement covering all
aspects of aviation, economic and technical, soon faded as
economic and political rivalries emerged between a number of the
conference's more prominent members, particularly the United
States and the United Kingdom. 18
14 ANTHONY SAMPSON, EMPIRES OF THE SKY: THE POLITICS, CONTESTS AND
CARTELS OF WORLD AIRLINES 65-66 (1984).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. Virtually all of the major civil aviation powers of the prewar era were
represented. The Soviet Union was invited but declined to attend the Chicago
Conference, presumably because the pro-fascist governments of Spain and Portugal were
present. With World War II not yet over, the Axis nations (i.e., Germany, Italy, and
Japan) were not invited. Id.
18 Id. at 62-69. See also MCGILL CENTER FOR RESEARCH OF AIR & SPACE LAW,
LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANADIAN AIR TRANSPORT
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Although the Chicago Conference failed in its attempt to
formulate a comprehensive economic policy for international civil
aviation or to effectuate an exchange of traffic rights,19 it laid the
foundation for the postwar establishment of the ICAO,2 °
headquartered in Montreal,2' and gave the organization jurisdiction
over the many technical aspects of international civil aviation.22
Most of ICAO's work has been focused on aviation safety,
521-22 (1980) (citations omitted]. World War II not only transformed the scope of the
airlines but produced two contradictory political attitudes to the air. The horrors of air
warfare, culminating in the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, generated a new insistence that
both military and civil aircraft should be separated from national ambitions and put
under international control. Yet every government was more convinced that it must
protect and advance its own airlines, as the lifeline to its trade and security. See
SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 57.
The system, whereby all over the world scheduled international air services are
performed on the basis of bilateral air transport agreements is a result of the
failure of the 1944 Chicago Conference and the subsequent failure of P.I.C.A.O.
and I.C.A.O. to agree upon a multilateral exchange of traffic rights for
scheduled international air services. A multilateral agreement in the exchange
of traffic rights was impossible in 1944 because of the widely divergent views
of the two key aviation powers at the time, the U.S.A. and the U.K., on the
economics of international air transport. The U.K. was then champion of a
system of strict intergovernmental regulation of international air transport,
whereas the U.S. advocated a system of free competition between international
air carriers.
McGILL CENTER FOR RESEARCH OF AIR AND SPACE LAW, supra, at 521-22.
19 Andras Vamos-Goldman, The Stagnation of Economic Regulation Under Public
International Air Law: Examining Its Contribution to the Woeful State of the Airline
Industry, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 425, 431 (1996).
20 See ANDREAS LOWENFIED, AVIATION LAW § 11-5 (1972). Today, IACO is a
member of the United Nations' family of international organizations. Id.
21 Id. The participants in the Chicago Conference hoped to reach agreement with
respect to both (a) safety, communications and technology, and (b) economic regulatory
issues of entry, rates, frequency and capacity. The Convention created ICAO and gave it
important responsibilities over the former questions, which it has performed quite well.
But ICAO was given only limited general policy directions over the more controversial
economic issues, and until relatively recently, the organization steered clear of them. Id.
22 ICAO came into being on April 4, 1947, when the Chicago Convention entered
into force. It began operations in 1947 under the umbrella of the United Nations.
GERALD F. FITZGERALD, ICAO Now and in the Coming Decades, in INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT: LAW ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 47, 52 (N. Matte ed.,
1976). See also Michael Milde, The Chicago Convention-After Forty Years, 9 ANNALS
OF AIR& SPACE L. 119, 121 (1984).
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navigation, and security," though it also has been the forum for
updating liability and other private law regimes in civil aviation. 4
Indeed, ICAO's principal objective is "ensuring the safety of
23 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, Annex 17. Annex 17 is supplemented by the
ICAO Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful
Interference (ICAO Doc. 8973) (6"' ed. 2002) and its Strategic Action Plan. Abeyrante,
supra note 1, at 121-130. In addition, several multilateral conventions have been drafted
under ICAO auspices, including:
" The Tokyo Convention of 1963 requires that a hijacked aircraft be restored to the
aircraft commander and the passengers be permitted to continue their journey.
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14, 1963,20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, reprinted in 58 AM.
J. INT'L L. 566 (1959), and 18 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 169 (1993), and PAUL
STEPHEN DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 433 (1987)
[hereinafter DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION].
" The Hague Convention of 1970 declares hijacking to be an international "offense"
and requires the state to which an aircraft is hijacked to extradite or exert jurisdiction
over the hijacker and prosecute him, imposing "severe penalties" if he is found
guilty. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971), 18
ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 201 (1993), and DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra, at 441.
" The Montreal Convention of 1971 not only expands the definition of "offense" to
include communications of false information and unlawful acts against aircraft or air
navigation facilities, but also requires prosecution thereof. Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,
24 U.S.T. 567, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into force on Jan. 26, 1973, with 150
ratifications), reprinted in 18 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 225 (1993), and DEMPSEY,
LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION supra, at 445. See PAUL
STEPHEN DEMPSEY ET AL. AVIATION LAW & REGULATION § 9.13 (1992) [hereinafter
DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION].
" The Montreal Protocol of 1988. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (added airport security to the international regime). ICAO Doc. 9518,
reprinted in 18 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE LAW 253 (1993).
" The Montreal Convention of 1991 prevents the manufacture, possession, and
movement of unmarked explosives. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S.
No. 7570, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 115, 18 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 269 (1993).
For a review of the work ICAO has done in the area of security, see Dempsey, Aviation
Security, supra note 6, at 688, and Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aerial Terrorism: Unilateral
and Multilateral Responses to Aircraft Hijacking, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 427 (1987).
24 See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, Pennies From Heaven: Breaking Through the
Liability Limitations of Warsaw, 22 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 267, 271 (1997).
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international civil aviation worldwide .... ,25
Certain provisions of the Chicago Convention impose direct
obligations upon member states and require no implementing
legislation.26 According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, these include:
" Article 5 - The right of non-scheduled aircraft to fly over
another contracting state or land for non-traffic purposes in
another contracting state's territory, subject to certain
conditions;
* Article 8 - Pilotless aircraft may not be flown in another
state's territory without its permission;
* Article 15 - Airports shall provide uniform and
nondiscriminatory conditions, fees, and charges to aircraft of
any contracting state;
" Article 16 - Contracting states are free to search aircraft on
landing or departure and inspect the certificates and other
documents required by the Chicago Convention;
" Article 20 - All aircraft shall bear appropriate nationality and
registration marks;
" Article 24 - Fuel, oil, spare parts, regular equipment, and
aircraft stores aboard an aircraft shall be free from customs
duties;
• Article 29 - Specified documents must be carried aboard
aircraft;
" Article 32 - Pilots and operating crews must be licensed;
* Article 33 - Certificates of airworthiness that satisfy the
requirements of the Chicago Convention issued by the state of
registry must be recognized as valid by other Contracting
states.27
However, other articles require implementing legislation or
regulations, including:
* Article 12 - Each contracting state must promulgate rules and
regulations governing flight and the maneuver of aircraft, and
such regulations must be uniform, to the greatest possible
25 ICAO Assemb. Res. 32-11.
26 See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 776 (1988).
27 British Caledonian Airways v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
This case will be discussed in detail below.
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extent, with those established under the Chicago Convention;
" Article 14 - Each state must take effective measures to
prevent the spread of communicable diseases;
" Article 22 - Each state must adopt measures to facilitate and
expedite navigation to prevent unnecessary delays,
particularly in implementing immigration, quarantine,
customs, and clearance procedures;
" Article 23 - Each state must establish customs and
immigration procedures consistent with the practices
established or recommended under the Chicago Convention;
and
* Article 28 - Each state must provide air navigation facilities,
operational practices and rules, and aeronautical maps and
charts.28
Hence, states have much to do to fulfill their commitments under
the Chicago Convention.
Article 12 of the Chicago Convention requires every
contracting state to keep its regulations uniform, to the greatest
extent possible, with those established under the Convention. 29
Article 37 of the Convention attempts to achieve uniformity in air
navigation, by requiring that every contracting state cooperate in
achieving the "highest practicable degree of uniformity in
regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to
aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in
which uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation."3
The sentence that follows provides that, "[t]o this end [ICAO]
shall adopt and amend from time to time... international
standards and recommended practices and procedures" addressing
various aspects of air navigation.31  Therefore, ICAO's 188
member states have an affirmative obligation to conform their
domestic laws, rules, and regulations to the international leveling
28 Id.
29 "The elimination of the multitude of conflicting national aeronautical
regulations, through the domestic implementation of the regulatory SARPs prescribed in
the Annexes, would be an immense step forward in facilitating international civil
aviation." THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, LAW MAKING 1N THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION 102 (1969).




standards adopted by ICAO.32
In 1948, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution encouraging
contracting states to adopt "so far as practicable, the precise
language of those ICAO Standards that are of a regulatory
character .... ICAO has drafted its Annexes in a way to
"facilitate incorporation, without major textual changes, into
national legislation. 34 Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing),35 Annex 6
(Operation of Aircraft),3 6  and Annex 8 (Airworthiness of
Aircraft) 37 require ICAO's 188 member states to promulgate
domestic laws and regulations to certify airmen, aircraft, and
aircraft operators as airworthy and competent to carry out safe
operations in international aviation.3" Subject to the notification of
differences, the legal regime effectively assumes that states are in
compliance with these safety mandates. 39 Thus, although member
states retain the right to restrict particular aircraft from their
skies,4" they lose the right to ignore the safety mandates of the
32 Id.
33 International Standards and Recommended Practices: Personnel Licensing,
International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on International Civil Aviation,
Annex 1 (7th ed. 1982) [hereinafter Chicago Convention Annex 1].
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 International Standards and Recommended Practices: Operation of Aircraft,
International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on International Civil Aviation,
Annex 6 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter Chicago Convention Annex 6].
37 International Standards: Airworthiness of Aircraft, International Civil Aviation
Organization, Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 8 (7th ed. 1983)
[hereinafter Chicago Convention Annex 8].
38 Id.
39 However, Professor Buergenthal insists no such presumption is warranted.
BURGENTHAL, supra note 29, at 67.
40 BIN CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 3 (1962); see
SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 69-70. Dr. Michael Milde summarized the principle of
sovereignty as embraced by the Chicago Convention:
The Convention on International Civil Aviation-the cornerstone of legal
regulation of international civil aviation for the past forty years-is based on the
principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty of States over their airspace ...
except with special permission or authorization. Consequently, the granting of
the economic rights to carry traffic remains a sovereign prerogative of each
contracting State and is dealt with in bilateral agreements on air services which
take into consideration mutual economic benefits of the States concerned and
the proper balance of interest between such states.
2004)
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governing international organization - ICAO." This assumption
of universal compliance goes further with the Chicago Convention
requirement that an airman or operator certificate, or certificate or
airworthiness, issued by one contracting state shall be recognized
as valid by all others.42
Under Article 33, states are obliged to recognize the validity of
the certificates of airworthiness and personnel licenses issued by
the state in which the aircraft is registered, so long as the standards
under which such certificates or licenses were rendered are at least
as stringent as those established under the Chicago Convention.43
But this principle of mutual recognition works only if all states are
implementing the SARPs with an equal degree of diligence. Too
often, it is too difficult or impossible to tell." The negative
implications of Article 33 are that if a state fails to comply with
"the minimum standards which may be established from time to
time pursuant to this Convention,, 45 then other states are not
obliged to recognize the validity of the certificates of
airworthiness issued by the delinquent state, and may therefore
ban such aircraft from their skies. This is an important incentive
for compliance with the international obligations established by
ICAO.
Milde, supra note 22, at 121-22.
41 See SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 69-70.
42 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 33.
43 A similar provision was included in Article 13 to the Paris Convention of 1919,
the predecessor of the Chicago Convention. U.S. courts have recognized the duty of the
FAA to abide by its Article 33 Chicago Convention obligation to recognize as valid
licenses issued ay another signatory state, provided that the requirements underlying
such licenses are equal or superior to those required under the Annexes. Professional
Pilots v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1997); British Caledonian Airways v. Bond,
665 F.2d 1153, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also In the Matter of Evergreen Helicopters,
2000 FAA Lexis 247 (2000).
44 As one scholar noted in 1995, "[v]ery low levels of response by States to
amendments to annexes, completely inadequate response levels regarding the
notification of differences to standards, and perhaps even instances of misrepresentation
of national regulatory provisions and responsibilities, evidence shortcomings of the
present ICAO framework in the field of safety oversight." Roderick D. van Dam, Recent
Developments in Aviation Safety Oversight, 20 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 307, 317
(1995). Dr. John Saba observed, "[m]any States still fail to remedy aviation safety
deficiencies, often due to a lack of will, means, and/or ability to do so." Saba, supra note
7, at 544.
45 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 33.
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B. International Standards as Soft Law, or Hard Law?
The ICAO Council46 is mandated to adopt international
standards and recommended practices (SARPs) on issues affecting
the safety and efficiency of air navigation47 and, for convenience,
designate them as Annexes to the Chicago Convention.48 Though
designated as Annexes for convenience, the SARPs do not actually
become part of the Convention.49 Thus, the question arises as to
46 The ICAO Council, not the Assembly, is the supreme body of the agency
because it holds the power to exercise both the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers of the agency. See Peter Ateh-Afac Fossungu, The ICAO Assembly: The Most
Unsupreme of Supreme Organs in the United Nations System: A Critical Analysis of
Assembly Sessions, 26 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 2 (1998).
47 SARPs, designated for convenience as Annexes to the Convention, shall be
effective in a period of time not less than three months after they are approved by a two-
thirds vote of the ICAO Council, unless a majority of states register their disapproval
within that period. Chicago Convention, supra note 10, arts. 37, 54(1), 90.
48 Id. 54(1). The ICAO Council has adopted the following Annexes:
Annex 1: Personnel Licensing
Annex 2: Rules of the Air
Annex 3: Meteorology
Annex 4: Aeronautical Charts
Annex 5: Units of Measurement to be Used in Air-Ground Communications
Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft, International Commercial Air Transport
Annex 7: Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks
Annex 8: Airworthiness of Aircraft
Annex 9: Facilitation of International Air Transport
Annex 10: Aeronautical Telecommunication
Annex 11: Air Traffic Services
Annex 12: Search and Rescue
Annex 13: Aircraft Accident Inquiry
Annex 14: Aerodromes
Annex 15: Aeronautical Information Services
Annex 16: Environmental Protection
Annex 17: Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of
Unlawful Interference
Annex 18: Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air
DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AvIATION, supra note 23, at 275.
49 Amendments to the Chicago Convention require a two-thirds vote of the
members of the ICAO General Assembly and ratification by not less than two-thirds of
the contracting states. Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 94. In contrast, the
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whether SARPs are "soft law" or "hard law."50
Although there is an obligation to attempt to achieve
uniformity in law under Article 37, Article 38 of the Chicago
Convention provides that any state finding it impracticable to
comply with SARPs or which has or adopts regulations different
therefrom "shall give immediate notification" to ICAO of the
differences.5 The Council is then obliged to immediately notify
other states of such noncompliance. 2 Thus, if a state submits its
objection in a timely fashion on grounds of the impracticability of
compliance, it may reject an Annex either in whole or part.53 This
"opt out" provision arguably makes the SARPs only "soft law,"
for the SARPs can hardly be deemed binding if states are free to
reject them on the subjective self-determination that it would be
predecessor convention - the Paris Convention of 1919 - created the Commission
Internationale de la Navigation Aerienne, and gave it power to promulgate Annexes
thereto as binding amendments to the Convention. That is one of the reasons the United
States, unwilling to vest lawmaking authority in an international organization, failed to
ratify the Paris Convention.
50 Christine Chinkin writes:
The complexity of international legal affairs has outpaced traditional methods of
law-making, necessitating management through international organizations,
specialized agencies, programmes, and private bodies that do not fit the
paradigm of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the [International Court of Justice].
Consequently the concept of soft law facilitates international co-operation by
acting as a bridge between the formalities of law-making and the needs of
international life by legitimating behavior and creating stability.
CHRISTINE CHINKIN, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 32 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
51 With respect to amendments to the SARPs, under Article 38 of the Chicago
Convention, any state that does not amend its own regulations to comply therewith, must
notify ICAO within 60 days; and the ICAO Council shall, in turn, notify member states
of the differences. Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 38.
52 Id.
53 BUERGENTHAL, supra note 29, at 67. "With some exceptions.., the Contracting
States have no legal obligation to implement or comply with the provisions of a duly
promulgated Annex or amendment thereto, unless they find it 'practicable' to do so." Id.
at 76. Burgenthal also argues that "contracting states have retained the right to depart
from the provisions of an existing standard any time they decide to so, provided only that
they notify the Organization accordingly." Id. at 78. This interpretation is inconsistent
with the literal language of Article 38, which requires "immediate notification" as to
differences between domestic law and the SARPs and notification "within sixty days" of
differences between domestic law and ICAO amendments to the SARPs. Chicago
Convention, supra note 10, art. 38.
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"impracticable to comply." 54
SARPs become effective as Annexes to the Convention not
less than three months after they are approved by a two-thirds vote
of the Council, unless during that period they are disapproved by a
majority of the members of the ICAO General Assembly.55
Typically, they are not issued until after extensive consultation
with member states, and consensus is achieved, a process that
sometimes takes years. Indeed, member states are obliged by
Article 37 of the Chicago Convention to collaborate in achieving
the "highest practicable degree of uniformity" in the adoption of
SARPs.
If the requirement for immediate notification of
noncompliance is triggered by the date on which the SARPs
becomes effective, or from the date on which they are notified of
its adoption, 6 it would seem a state would be bound if it failed to
notify ICAO of the difference promptly, or in fact, immediately. If
the immediate notification requirement is triggered by the
discovery by a state of the impracticability of compliance with
SARPs, then such notification can come at any time - indeed,
years or decades after a SARPs becomes effective. In practice,
states are free to notify ICAO of impracticality of compliance with
SARPs at any time, or indeed, not at all.57
Moreover, Article 38 is curiously worded, for it also provides
that notification of a difference between a state's domestic law and
an amendment to a SARP must be made within sixty days of the
adoption of the amendment. Failure to notify ICAO within the 60
day period would therefore lead to a presumption of compliance,
and arguably, binding applicability. But why would a state have
an open window ad infinitum to opt out for any newly
promulgated SARP, and only a sixty-day opt out period for any
amendment thereto? It would have been cleaner draftsmanship
and a far more meaningful notification requirement, had the
Convention addressed the need for prompt notification after the
SARPs promulgation, and that a state that failed to notify would
54 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 38. Milde, supra note 2, at 5.
However, to date no SARPs have ever been rejected by the ICAO General Assembly. Id.
55 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 90(a).
56 Id. art. 90(b).
57 Id.
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be deemed in compliance and bound thereby.
Putting together the requirements of Articles 37 and 38, a state
has an affirmative duty to harmonize its domestic law with the
SARPs.58 This duty is emasculated by the ability of a state to opt-
out if it deems it impracticable to comply.59 If it finds
impracticality, it has a duty to notify ICAO immediately (though it
is unclear whether it must notify immediately after the
promulgation of the SARPs or immediately upon discovering the
impracticality), unless it is an amendment to a SARPs, in which
case it must notify ICAO within 60 days.60 And in practice, these
notification requirements are hollow, as they have been ignored by
most states.
In effect, this peculiar process creates something of a paradox
in international law. Article 1 of the Chicago Convention
recognizes that all signatory states reserve complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above their territories. 61 Article 37
gives ICAO the authority to promulgate Annexes to the Chicago
Convention, and member states must comply with the Annex
standards and procedures 62 unless they promptly object under
Article 38. Most do not exercise their right to object under Article
38, either because they agree to the standards imposed upon them,
or because their transport or foreign ministries lack a sophisticated
understanding of the obligations to which they have been
subjected, or of their duty to so notify ICAO. In fact, although
states have an obligation to notify ICAO of differences between
the standards and procedures set forth in the Annexes and their
domestic legislation and are encouraged to notify ICAO even if
there are none, 63 the overwhelming majority of states do neither.64
58 Id.
59 Id. arts. 37, 38.
60 Id.
61 In the Chicago Convention of 1944, the world community reaffirmed a basic
principle that had been the foundation of its predecessor, the Paris Convention of 1919:
"The Contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." Chicago Convention, supra note 10.
DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra note 23, at 387.
See Abeyratne, supra note 1, at 136.
62 See DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra
note 23, at 387; Abeyrante, supra note 1, at 136.
63 International Standards and Recommended Practices: Aeronautical Information
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As we shall see below, the ICAO audit programs have
significantly elucidated the degree of state compliance with certain
Annexes. However, the failure of states to notify ICAO of
differences between their domestic laws and regulatory practices
and the SARPs created tremendous uncertainty as to whether
uniformity is being achieved, a condition potentially dangerous in
an area such as aviation safety.65 There is no explicit sanction in
the Convention for failing to notify.
66
Services, International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on International Civil
Aviation, Annex 15 (7th ed. 1987) [hereinafter Chicago Convention Annex 15].
64 With respect to the overwhelming number of Annexes, between 1984-1994,
fewer than half the states notified ICAO of differences to amendments of Annexes.
Abeyratne, supra note 1, at 131. Dr. Abeyratne concludes, "[i]t is impossible at the
present time to indicate with any degree of accuracy the state of the implementation of
regulatory Annex material." Id. at 132. ICAO attributes this failure to notify to four
causes:
1. Insufficient communication between ICAO and recipient states; loss of
documentation by recipients and delays in delivering the documentation
to the responsible party beyond the target date for replies; organizational
structures of civil aviation authorities which render difficulties in
identification of, and routing to, the responsible party;
2. Insufficient resources within states to expeditiously consider and process
ICAO documentation and to implement the relevant standards into their
national legislation;
3. Difficulty in comprehending and interpreting Annex material as well as
subject matter which is beyond the level of expertise of the recipient
administration; and
4. Possible lack of understanding about the role of states in the consultation
phase of the development of ICAO Standards.
Id. at 132-33. Dr. Abeyratne adds, "[m]ore fundamentally, it is always a possibility that
States may have insufficient resources either to implement Standards or to advise ICAO
of non-compliance with relevant Standards." Id. at 133. He reaches identical
conclusions in R.I.R. Abeyratne, Prevention of Controlled Flight into Terrain:
Regulatory and Legal Aspects, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 159, 167-68 (2000).
65 For example, as of 2000, 55 states had notified ICAO of the differences between
their domestic laws and Annex 1; 21 states notified ICAO that there were no differences;
and 109 provided no notification whatsoever. See Chicago Convention, supra note 10,
Supplement to Annex I (Personnel Licensing). For an earlier summary of the poor
response rates of member states to their conformity with the requirements of the
Annexes to the Chicago Convention, Michael B. Jennison, The Chicago Convention and
Safety After 50 Years, 20 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 283, 291 (1995). One should not
assume that the failure of a state to report its differences means that it has none.
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 29, at 99.
66 Chicago Convention Annex 15, supra note 63.
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But a state fails to comply with the SARPs at its own peril, for
as noted above, there are implicit sanctions that are potentially
severe. A state that fails to comply may find its airman, aircraft,
air carrier, and/or airport certifications and licenses not recognized
as valid by a foreign government, thereby terminating their
operation to, from, or through foreign territories, isolating it from
the global economy.67 Private sector insurance coverage for
airlines and airports may be impossible to obtain.68 Moreover, the
delinquent government would be responsible, and arguably liable,
should an aircraft collision or other aviation tragedy occur, the
proximate cause of which was the failure of the government to
comply with a relevant SARP.69 Hence, whatever de jure "soft
law" attributes SARPs may have, they appear to have
corresponding defacto "hard law" attributes as well.7"
Finally, there is one major area in which the SARPs are
decidedly "hard law." Article 12 of the Chicago Convention
provides, inter alia, that: "over the high seas, the rules in force
shall be those established under this Convention."'" Hence, ICAO
has law-making authority over 72% of the earth's surface.72 This
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 One might argue that the failure to notify ICAO of differences results in a
presumption of full compliance with the standards at issue, and that such states should
bear full legal liability for any harmful consequences of their non-compliance. See
Michael Milde, The Chicago Convention - Are Major Amendments Necessary Or
Desirable 50 Years Later?, 19 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 401,426 (1994).
70 Herbert V. Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global
Governance vs. Sovereignty, 50 KAN. L. REv. 779, 780-81 (2002).
For the most part, international standards have been developed and
disseminated as norms or principles for voluntary acceptance by
countries and other persons. In this sense, international standards
would not be legally binding norms and would be generally viewed
as 'soft law.' However, it is important to recognize at the same time
that several standards have taken the form of binding legal rules
established by international treaty or national legislation, and, in
these cases, the standards constitute 'hard law.'
Id. However, the SARPs over the high seas under Annex 2 apply without
exception. See International Standards: Rules of the Air, International Civil
Aviation Organization, Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 2
(8th ed. 1986).




jurisdictional scope, which is unparalleled by any other
international organization, in effect, this makes ICAO a paradigm
of global governance.73
C. Bilateral Requirements
The failure of the Chicago Convention to address economic
regulatory issues led to a series of bilateral negotiations between
states. In 1946, the United States and the United Kingdom
concluded a bilateral air transport agreement, popularly referred to
as Bermuda I, which exchanged traffic rights between the two
nations, and provided a mechanism for regulating rates.74 For four
decades, Bermuda I was the template by which U.S. bilateral
agreements were negotiated, and for a number of other nations as
well.75
Bermuda I also addressed various "soft rights" issues.76 One
such issued addressed was safety. Bermuda I provides that the
certificates of airworthiness, competency, and licenses issues by
one contracting state shall be honored as valid by the other.77
Subsequent agreements have repeated, and elaborated on, this
succinct clause.78
A typical, modern "open skies" bilateral agreement is the U.S.-
Singapore bilateral air transport agreement.79 It repeats Bermuda
I's reciprocal recognition clause, but adds that such recognition is
contingent on the requirements for such licensing or certification
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Turbulence in the 'Open Skies': The Deregulation of
International Air Transport, 15 TRANSP. L.J. 305, 314-18 (1987). [hereinafter Dempsey,
Turbulence in 'Open Skies']. The principal areas in which other nations diverged from
the Bermuda I model was on its absence of predetermination of capacity and pooling
provisions. Id.
76 Air Services Agreement, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K., 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No.
1507, reprinted in DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION,
supra note 23, at 419 [hereinafter Air Services Agreement]; See also Dempsey,
Turbulence in 'Open Skies,' supra note 75, at 314-318.
77 Air Services Agreement, supra note 75, art. 4. "Soft rights" include such things
as obligations for nondiscriminatory treatment, and are distinguished from "hard rights"
which include such things as authorization to fly certain routes. Id.
78 Id.
79 Air Transport Agreement, Apr. 8, 1997, U.S.-Singapore, 3 CCH Avi. 26,495a.
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are at least as stringent as those set forth in the Chicago
Convention and its Annexes, echoing Article 33 of the Chicago
Convention. ° It further provides that either state may request
consultations concerning the aviation safety standards maintained
by the other.8" Following such consultations, should one state
conclude that the other does not maintain safety standards at least
as stringent as those required under the Chicago Convention and
its Annexes, the other state shall be notified of the deficiency and
the steps necessary to cure it.82 The state must then take
appropriate corrective action.83 In the event the other state fails to
take such action in a reasonable time, the state concerned about the
deficiency may "withhold, revoke, suspend, or limit the operating
authorization or technical permission" of the other's flag-
carriers.8 4
III. Domestic Compliance with International Aviation Safety
Requirements
A. To Comply, or Not to Comply: That is the Question
Professor Michael Milde observed that:
[T]he vast law-making work of the Council in the
drafting of the [SARPs] represents the most visible
and monumental achievement of ICAO during its
existence, contributing significantly to safe and
orderly air navigation. However, the real and
effective level of implementation of [SARPs] by
the contracting States on a global level is a matter
of grave concern and doubt.85
The system of universal trust and mutual recognition
established by the Chicago Convention was jeopardized by the
fact that many states were not conforming to the SARPs. Some
states were too poor to establish comprehensive air navigation and
safety agencies or, if established, to fund them sufficiently so that




84 Id. at art. 6(2).
85 Milde, supra note 69, at 425-26.
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they could properly fulfill their mandate.86 Others had not
promulgated laws and regulations to fulfill their obligations under
the SARPs.87 In some states, civil aviation does not receive the
attention governmental leaders accord other ministries and
agencies deemed "more important."" Like many specialized
United Nations agencies, ICAO possessed no enforcement power
to sanction violators.89
In 1992, the ICAO Assembly explicitly called upon states to
reaffirm their safety obligations, particularly those in Annexes 1
and 6 of the Chicago Convention, and urged them to "review their
national legislation implementing those obligations and to review
their safety oversight procedures to ensure effective
86 In 1992, the ICAO Assembly recognized that many states "may not have the
regulatory framework or financial and technical resources to carry out the minimum
requirements of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes." ICAO Assemb. Res. 29-13.
87 Id.
88 Dr. John Saba enumerates four major reasons why states fail to comply with
their obligations under the Chicago Convention Annexes:
(1) Primary aviation legislation and regulations may be either non-
existent or inadequate (for example, a failure to provide adequate
enforcement powers);
(2) Institutional structures that regulate and supervise aviation safety
often do not have the authority and/or autonomy to effectively satisfy
their regulatory duties;
(3) Human resources in many states may be plagued by a lack of
appropriate expertise largely do to inadequate funding and training
(and trained staff may leave government jobs for better-paying jobs
in the aviation industry); and
(4) Financial resources allocated to civil aviation safety are insufficient
since many developing countries to not consider this a high priority
compared to other demands such as health care, education, irrigation
and poverty.
Saba, supra note 7, at 545.
89 Mark Lee Morrison, Navigating the Tumultuous Skies of International Aviation:
The Federal Aviation Administration 's Response to Non-Compliance With International
Safety Standards, 2 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 621, 642 (1995). The only enforcement
power ICAO has, addresses the dispute settlement authority of the Council under
Chapter XVIII of the Chicago Convention. If an airline fails to comply with a Council
decision, its operations shall be suspended by all contracting states, and its government
shall lose its vote in the ICAO General Assembly. See Chicago Convention, supra note
10, arts. 87-88. Since the Council has never rendered a decision on the merits, these
provisions have never been invoked.
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implementation... ,,90 ICAO encouraged member states to
"promote global harmonization of national rules" for the
implementation of the SARPs and "to use in their own national
regulations, as far as practicable, the precise language of ICAO
regulatory standards in their application of ICAO standards and
seek harmonization of national rules with other states in respect of
higher standards they have in force or intend to introduce."9'
Three years later, the ICAO Secretariat reached the discouraging
conclusion that it was "impossible to indicate with any degree of
accuracy or certainty what the state of implementation of
regulatory Annex material really is, because a large number of
contracting states have not notified ICAO of their compliance with
or differences to Standards in the Annexes for some considerable
time. '  Though ICAO had attempted to facilitate compliance by
publishing numerous manuals instructing member states on how to
comply, 93 many states either could not, or would not, implement
their international legal aviation safety obligations.
B. Unilateral Oversight of State Compliance with
International Obligations
1. The Courts Clip the Wings of the United States:
British Caledonian v. Bond
Unilateral enforcement of international obligations must
follow the procedural requirements embodied in those
obligations.94 This was the lesson of British Caledonian Airways
90 ICAO Assemb. Res. 29-13.
91 ICAO Assemb. Res. 29-3.
92 C-WP/10218, 4.9, quoted in Milde, supra note 2, at 8-9.
93 See, e.g., ICAO Doc. 8335 - Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection,
Certification and Continued Surveillance; ICAO Doc. 8984 - Manual of Civil
Aviation Medicine; ICAO Doc. 9376 - Preparation of an Operations Manual; ICAO
Doc. 9379 - Manual of Procedures for Establishment and Management of a State's
Personnel Licensing System; ICAO Doc. 9388 - Manual of Model Regulations for
National Control of Flight Operations and Continuing Airworthiness of Aircraft; ICAO
Doc. 9389 - Manual of Procedures for an Airworthiness Organization; ICAO
Doc. 9642 - Continuing Airworthiness Manual; ICAO Doc. 9734 - Safety Oversight
Audit Manual, Part A - The Establishment and Management of a State's Safety
Oversight System; and ICAO Doc. 9735 - Safety Oversight Audit Manual.
94 Occasionally, a national court has to intervene to force a governmental unit to
abide by the nation's international obligations. Professor Kumm observes, "[w]hatever
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Ltd. v. Bond,95 the only case in which the United States has been
brought before a court for violating the Chicago Convention.
On May 25, 1979, an engine tore off the wing of American
Airlines flight 191, a DC-10, shortly after take-off from Chicago
O'Hare International Airport. 96 All 271 on board the aircraft
perished in the crash. 97 Three days later, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) issued an Emergency Airworthiness
Directive (EAD) requiring all U.S. operators of DC-10s to inspect
engine pylons. The following day, the FAA issued another EAD
grounding all domestic DC-10s. 98 On June 5, 1979, the FAA
Administrator issued an Emergency Order of Suspension (SFAR
40) for all airworthiness certificates for domestic DC-10 aircraft,
and prohibited the operation in U.S. airspace of all foreign-
registered DC-10 aircraft.99 While one can only speculate as to the
motives, the suspension of foreign-flag aircraft arguably enhanced
the safety of U.S. residents who might board them and also
equalized the relative financial impact on U.S. carriers.
Several foreign-flag carriers objected. 00 In British Caledonian
Airways, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that the relevant
airworthiness standards were properly promulgated by ICAO and
set forth in Annex 8.'0 The court also found that Article 33 of the
Chicago Convention requires that "the judgment of the country of
registry that an aircraft is airworthy must be respected, unless the
country of registry is not observing the 'minimum standards' [of
the reasons for widespread state compliance with international law, however, problems
of noncompliance remain sufficiently widespread for national judicial actors to have a
potentially significant role in the enforcement of international law." Mattias Kumm,
International Law in National Courts: The International Rule of Law and the Limits of
the Internationalist Model, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 19, 23 (2003). U.S. courts have embraced
various theories to enforce treaty obligations, including honor, natural law, contracts, and
national interest. Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and
Breach, 95 AM. J. INT. L. 313, 324-29 (2001).
95 British Caledonian Airways v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981). This case
is discussed in Troy A. Rolf, International Aircraft Noise Certification, 65 J. AIR L. &
COM. 383,400-02 (2000).




100 Id. at 1156.
101 Id. at 1160.
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Annex 8]. 112 It found that the requirements of Article 33 were
self-executing, requiring no implementing legislation by the U.S.
Congress. But Congress had mandated, under former Section
1102 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, that the FAA
Administrator must, in exercising and performing his powers and
duties, "do so consistently with any obligation assumed by the
United States in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be
in force between the United States and any foreign country or
foreign countries. 1 °3
The court concluded that:
[B]ecause the Administrator at no time questioned
whether the foreign governments met the minimum
safety standards set by the ICAO, his issuance of
SFAR 40 and his refusal to rescind the order after
the foreign governments had revalidated the
airworthiness certificates for aircraft flying under
their flags would appear to have violated Article 33
and, therefore, section 1102.104
There was but a single proper way for the FAA to restrict a
foreign-flag carrier based upon the airworthiness of its aircraft: "If
doubts about airworthiness exist, one country may refuse to
recognize another country's certificate of airworthiness, but only if
the certificating nation has not observed the minimum standards of
airworthiness established in Annex 8 pursuant to Articles 33 and
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1162, citing § 1102 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1502
-1102, 49 U.S.C. § 40105(b) (2004).
104 Id. at 1162-63. The FAA also argued that Article 9 of the Chicago Convention
gave it the authority to restrict the flight of foreign aircraft into the United States. Article
9(b) authorizes a state "in exceptional circumstances or during a period of emergency, or
in the interest of public safety, and with immediate effect, temporarily to restrict or
prohibit flying over the whole or any part of its territory, on condition that such
restriction or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of nationality ......
Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 9(b). The British Caledonian court held that
Article 9 is aimed at restricting the territorial access of all aircraft, rather than
restricting the movements of particular types of aircraft .... Article 9 permits a
country to safeguard its airspace when entry by all aircraft would be dangerous
or intrusive because of conditions on the ground. Article 9 does not allow one
country to ban landing and take-off because of doubts about the airworthiness of
particular foreign aircraft, in derogation of Article 33.
British Caledonian Airways v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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27 of the Chicago Convention.""1 5 The FAA Administrator had
failed to do this. Ten years later, the U.S. would launch a program
to ferret out those nations not in compliance with Annex 8.06
2. United States Airport Security Audits
The United States began auditing foreign venues for
compliance with ICAO SARPs with its review of foreign
compliance with Annex 17 - Security.0 7 In 1985, Congress
required the FAA to assess the security procedures of foreign
airports and foreign air carriers that serve the United States. 8
This Act required the FAA to conduct a security audit of foreign
airports, and if it found that an airport failed to comply with
Annex 17, it notified the appropriate authorities of its discovery
and recommended steps to achieve compliance. 9 If the airport
failed to correct the deficiency, the FAA published a notice that
the airport failed its security audit in the Federal Register, posted
its identity prominently at major U.S. airports, and notified the
news media.1 The FAA could also "withhold, revoke, or
prescribe conditions on the operating authority" of an airline that
flies to that airport, and the President may prohibit an airline from
flying to or from said airport from or to a point in the United
States.'
Where the U.S. Secretary of Transportation concluded that "a
condition exists that threatens the safety or security of passengers,
aircraft, or crew traveling to or from that airport; and the public
interest requires an immediate suspension of transportation
105 British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1164.
106 49 U.S.C. § 44907(e) (2004).
107 International Standards and Recommended Practices: Security, International
Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 17 (3d
ed. 1986).
108 Foreign Airport Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83. See 49 U.S.C. §
44906 (2004); DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION, supra note 23, § 9.25.
In order to be allowed to serve airports in the United States, foreign airlines must adopt
and implement security procedures established by the U.S. government. Foreign airlines
also are required to maintain effective security programs. 49 U.S.C. § 44906 (2004).
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between the United States and that airport,"' 2 he could suspend
U.S. and foreign airlines from serving the United States to or from
that airport"13  and impose fines upon carriers violating the
prohibition." 4 On the basis of unsatisfactory security audits and
other security concerns, the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT), the parent agency of the FAA, announced its intention to
suspend air service between the U.S. and Beirut in 1985, 15 Lagos
in 1992,116 Manila and Bogotd in 1995,"7 Athens in 1996,"8 and
Port-au-Prince in 1998.19 The DOT also has denied code-sharing
approval 121 to destinations in nations on the Department of State's
112 Id.
113 DOT Order 94-12-22 (1994) (denial of application of Nigeria Airlines for an
exemption to resume service to the United States); DOT Order 85-7-45 (1985)
("Effective immediately, and until further order of the Department, the holder and its
agents shall not sell in the United States any transportation by air which includes any
type of stop in Lebanon."); DOT Order 85-7-14 (1985) ("Recent terrorist activities by
groups based in Lebanon have brought into serious question the security of aircraft
transiting that country. Given the unstable state of events in Lebanon, and the possibility
of interference with U.S.-bound aircraft while on the ground in that country, we find that
the public interest requires us to terminate, effective immediately, all the authority MEA
currently holds to conduct scheduled operations to and from the United States on its own
behalf.").
114 See, e.g., DOT Order 93-10-26 (1993) (Middle East Airlines), DOT Order 85-7-
45 (1985) (Lebanon); DOT Order 92-10-17 (1992) (Murtala Mohammed International
Airport, Lagos, Nigeria); Dot Order 95-8-12 (1995) (Ninoy Aquino International
Airport, Manila, Philippines); DOT Order 95-9-15 (1995) (Eldorado International
Airport, Bogotd, Colombia); DOT Order 96-3-50 (1996) (Hellenikon International
Airport, Athens, Greece); DOT Order 95-8-12 (1995); DOT Order 98-1-24 (1998) (Port-
au-Prince International Airport, Haiti).




119 Id. All but Beirut were subsequently recertified. See, e.g., 2000 DOT Av. Lexis
128, DOT Order 2000-2-6 (2000) (Ponce, Puerto Rico); DOT Order 99-12-19 (1999)
(Murtala Mohammed International Airport, Lagos, Nigeria); DOT Order 96-12-44
(1996) (Eldorado International Airport, Bogota, Colombia); DOT Order 96-5-18 (1996)
(Hellenikon International Airport, Athens, Greece); DOT 96-3-2 (1996) (Ninoy Aquino
International Airport, Manila, Philippines).
120 Code-sharing is a means whereby one airline offers seats on the two-letter airline
code and flight number of another airline, principally in order to deceive consumers that
on-line, as opposed to interline, service is being performed. Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Carving the World into Fiefdoms: The Anticompetitive Future of Commercial Aviation,
27 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 247, 253 (2002).
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list of governments that support terrorism. 121 Given the significant
economic penalty for denial of the opportunity to serve the U.S.
market, these moratoria have been highly effective in encouraging
governmental and airport authorities to attain security
compliance. 22 After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the
U.S. Congress transferred the U.S. Foreign Assessment Program
to the newly-created Transportation Security Administration
[TSA], and subsequently moved that agency from DOT to the
nascent U.S. Department of Homeland Security.'
3. United States Safety Audits
Airlines in certain developing nations have a higher accident
rate than in developed parts of the world. 2 4 The United States
became sufficiently concerned with the absence of universal
norms in international aviation that it established an International
Aviation Safety Assessment Program (LASA) in 1991. 25
DOT Secretary Federico Pena announced that the IASA
program had been commenced "after a series of accidents and
incidents arising in the U.S. involving foreign commercial
aircraft .... ,126 Ostensibly, the IASA was launched in response to
the incident involving Avianca Airlines flight 52, which crashed at
Cove Neck, New York, on January 25, 1990, after running out of
fuel, killing all seventy-three people aboard.'27 Aviation Defense
Attorney, George Tompkins, points out, however, that a closer
look at that event reveals that U.S. FAA Air Traffic Control
(ATC) may have been at least as culpable as the pilots flying the
aircraft for the miscommunication that caused the crash. In
reaching this conclusion, Tompkins notes the fact that the plane
121 See, e.g., DOT Order 94-4-43 (1994) (Damascus, Syria).
122 See Dempsey, Aviation Security, supra note 6, at 705-07.
123 Id. at 717.
124 Carole Shifrin, Unanimous Aviation Commission Lays Out Blueprint for
Change, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. 42, (1998).
125 See generally Shadrach Stanleigh, "Excess Baggage" at the F.A.A.: Analyzing
the Tension Between "Open Skies " and Safety Policing in U.S. International Civil
Aviation Policy, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 965 (1998).
126 George N. Tompkins, Jr., Enforcement of Aviation Safety Standards, 20 ANNALS
OF AIR & SPACE L. 319, 324 (1995).
127 Anthony Broderick & James Loos, Government Aviation Safety Oversight -
Trust, But Verify, 67 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1035, 1039 (2002).
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ran out of fuel after its scheduled landing at New York Kennedy
International Airport was delayed for two hours after its initial
landing clearance. 128 Therefore, while it may have been an old
aircraft not maintained according to SARPs requirements, these
deficiencies were not the proximate cause of the crash. 29
Hence, when Secretary Pena was pointing to "a series of
accidents and incidents in the U.S. involving foreign commercial
aircraft" as the predicate for inaugurating the IASA program, it
appears the U.S. government should instead have focused at least
as much energy on FAA ATC errors. 3 Other sources have
revealed that before IASA was inaugurated, certain U.S.-flag
carriers had complained to DOT that "airlines operating under
non-U.S. flags were able to undercut the U.S. carriers because of
the substantially lower costs of inadequate foreign safety
regulations." '31 This implies that the policy issue was driven by
airline economics rather than airline safety.
Nevertheless, despite a weak factual predicate, the FAA began
to send out teams to meet with officials of the foreign Civil
Aviation Authorities (CAAs) and airlines to review relevant
records. 3' They collected evidence to determine whether the
foreign CAA and airlines were in compliance with SARPs. 33
Specifically, IASA focused on:
i. Whether the CAA has developed or implemented laws
or regulations in accordance with ICAO standards;
128 George Tompkins contends, "[t]he accident could very likely have been avoided
had the Colombian airline been subject to the same standards of operation as a domestic
U.S. airline." Morrison, supra note 89, at 642. But Tompkins never identifies which
Annex or SARPS the Columbian government violated that would have averted the crash.
Tompkins, supra note 126, at 324-25. The only other crash of a foreign-flag aircraft in
the U.S. within the preceding five years was a midair collision of an Aeromexico DC-9
with a small private aircraft on approach to Los Angeles International Airport on August
31, 1986. Id. That too, appeared to have been an ATC error. Id.
129 Id. This was also true after the ValuJet crash in the Everglades. The FAA
grounded all fifty-three aircraft for violations having nothing to do with the explosion of
improperly packed oxygen canisters in the cargo hold of ValuJet's aircraft. One wonders
whether, if ValuJet's fleet was so unsafe that it had to be grounded, why did it take a
crash to inspire the FAA to order such a suspension?
130 Tompkins, supra note 126, at 324.
131 Broderick & Loos, supra note 127, at 1039.
132 Jennison, supra note 65, at 292-97.
133 57 Fed. Reg. 38,342 (Aug. 24, 1992).
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2. Whether it lacks the technical expertise or resources to
license or oversee civil aviation;
3. Whether it lacks the flight operations capability to
certify, oversee, and enforce air carrier operations
requirements;
4. Whether it lacks aircraft maintenance requirements; and
5. Whether it lacks appropriately trained inspector
personnel required by ICAO standards.
134
In 1994, the FAA fitted JASA with teeth. 35 IASA announced
that it would publicly disclose the results of its audits, and would
classify countries into three categories, restricting the operations
of those airlines registered in noncompliant states:
* Category I (Acceptable) - these states were fully in
compliance with the SARPs;
* Category II (Conditional) - these states were not in
compliance with the SARPs, and their existing flag-carrier
operations to the U.S. could not be expanded until they were;
* Category III (Unacceptable) - these states were also not in
compliance with the SARPs but had no flag-carrier service to
the U.S. and could not begin such service until they were in
compliance. 1
36
Of the first thirty countries audited, the FAA determined that
nine, mostly Latin American governments, had inadequate
134 Morrison, supra note 89, at 626. Another source summarized them differently:
1. Whether the state had promulgated a law authorizing the appropriate
governmental agency to adopt regulations necessary to satisfy the
minimum standards set forth in the Annexes;
2. Whether the current regulations meet ICAO standards;
3. Whether procedures exist to implement those regulations;
4. Whether air carrier certification, inspection, and surveillance
programs meet those requirements; and
5. Whether the state has sufficient organizational and personnel
resources to implement those functions.
Olga Barreto, Safety Oversight: Federal Aviation Administration, International Civil
Aviation Organization, and Central American Aviation Safety Agency, 67 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 651, 656 (2002).
135 59 Fed. Reg. 46, 332 (Sept. 8, 1994) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 129).
136 Id.
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oversight.'37 The U.S. Secretary of Transportation encouraged
Americans flying to those counties either to use U.S.-flag carriers
or carriers of other countries that provide adequate safety
oversight.'38 In other words, one could fly safely on U.S.-flag
carriers, on an airline from a nation that had passed its IASA audit,
or on foreign-flag carriers that had flunked their IASA audit so
long as they "wet-leased" their aircraft and crew from a U.S.-flag
airline. 13 9 Publicly announcing which states had deficient safety
oversight would have a deleterious economic impact upon their air
carriers, and their tourism industries, thereby encouraging, albeit
grudgingly, increased compliance with their legal obligations
under the SARPs. 14' The FAA subsequently reduced its
compliance categories from three to two:
" Category I - in compliance with the SARPs;
" Category II - not in compliance with the SARPs because:
o The CAA lacks technical expertise, resources, and
organization to properly license or oversee air carrier
operations;
o The CAA does not have adequately qualified and trained
technical personnel;
o The CAA does not provide adequate inspector guidance
to ensure compliance with the SARPs; or
o The CAA does not have sufficient documentation and
records nor inadequate oversight of air carrier
operations. 141
137 Shirlyce Manning, The United States'Response to International Air Safety, 61 J.
AIR L. & COM. 505, 534 (1996). The nine countries were Belize, the Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, Ghana, Gambia, and Zaire.
Morrison, supra note 89, at 642.
138 Tompkins, supra note 126, at 326.
139 Morrison, supra note 89, at 624.
140 Id.
141 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY
ASSESSMENT (PHASE 2 ASSESSMENT RESULTS DEFINITIONS), at http://www.faa.gov/avr/
asa/iasadef5.htm (last visited April 26, '2004). Category I states were deemed in
compliance with SARPs. Category I1 states were not in compliance. Id. If a nation fell
into Category II, it would not be allowed to expand service to the United States until it
achieved Category I status. A Category II nation that did not serve the United States
would be allowed to begin service only if it wet-leased aircraft from a Category I nation.
Id. Public Disclosure of the Results of Foreign Civil Aviation Authority Assessments,
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As revealed in Table 1, as of 2004, more than twenty-five
states found themselves on the FAA list of noncompliant states,
including several relatively economically advanced nations, such
as Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Table I - FAA Flight Standards Service




Argentina 2 Jordan 1
Aruba 1 Kiribati 2*
Australia 1 Kuwait 1
Austria 1 Luxembourg 1
Bahamas I Marshall Islands I
Bangladesh 2 Malta 1
Belgium I Malaysia I
Belize 2* Mexico 1
Bermuda 1 Morocco 1
Bolivia 1 Nauru 2
Brazil 1 Netherlands 1
Netherlands Antilles:
Brunei Darussalam 1 Curacau, St. Martin, I
Bonaire, Saba, St.Eustatius
Bulgaria 2 New Zealand 1
Canada 1 Nicaragua 2*
Cape Verde I Norway 1




Chile I & Barbuda, Dominica, 2
Grenada, Montserrat, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent & The
Grenadines, St. Kitts &
Nevis
59 Fed. Reg. 46,332 (Sept. 8, 1994) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 129).
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China I Pakistan I
Colombia 1 Panama 2
Costa Rica 1 Paraguay 2*
Cote D' Ivoire 2 Peru I
Czech Republic I Philippines I
Democratic Republic
of Congo (formerly 2* Poland
Zaire)
Denmark 1 Portugal I
Dominican Republic 2* Romania 1
Ecuador 2 Russia 1
Egypt I Saudi Arabia I
Serbia & Montenegro
El Salvador I (Formerly Republic of 2
Yugoslavia)
Ethiopia 1 Singapore I
Finland 1 South Africa I
France 1 South Korea, Republic of I
Fiji 1 Spain 1
Gambia 2* Suriname 1
Germany 1 Swaziland 2*
Ghana 1 Sweden I
Greece 2 Switzerland I
Guatemala 2 Taiwan I
Guyana 2 Thailand 1
Haiti 2* Trinidad & Tobago 2
Honduras 2* Tonga I
Hong Kong 1 Turkey I
Hungary 1 Turks & Caicos 2
Iceland I Ukraine I
Ireland 1 United Arab Emirates 1
India 1 United Kingdom 1
Indonesia 1 Uruguay 2*
Israel I Uzbekistan I
Italy 1 Venezuela 2
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Jamaica 1Western Samoa I
Japan 1Zimbabwe 2*
Category 1 Meets ICAO Standards
Category 2 Does Not Meet ICAO Standards
Source: http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/iasa56ws.xls (last visited 3 Nov. 2004).
* indicates countries not serving the U.S. at the time of the assessment
The IASA program led to a growing chorus of nations asking
ICAO to step in and assume these duties.1
4 2
C. Multilateral Oversight of State Compliance with
International Obligations
Once again, U.S. unilateralism did not sit well with the world
community.' 43 Indeed, certain nations responded with hostility,
alleging that a desire for an economic advantage motivated the
United States" to impose an unfair trade practice.145  Some
criticized the United States as having "unfairly blemished all of
Latin American aviation" while withholding condemnation of
more politically important states, such as Russia and China.
146
Others complained of the "inconsistent application of policy, an
absence of transparency, a lack of coordination with ICAO, and an
absence of documented operating guidance to both inspectors and
those subject to assessment."' 47 Though the consensus was that
142 See Broderick & Loos, supra note 127, at 1043.
143 Jennison, supra note 65, at 291-97
144 Id. at 297.
145 Morrison, supra note 89, at 638.
146 Manning, supra note 137, at 537. There were "vocal protests by a number of
Latin American states that they had been victimized." Doug Cameron, Safer Than Ever,
AIRLINE Bus. 62 (Oct. 1997). Many Latin American states "believed the FAA had
unfairly picked them for review, arguing that other countries, such as China and Russia,
which reportedly had serious problems complying with ICAO's international safety
standards, were treated in a better way because the United States considered them to be
more important trading partner." Barreto, supra note 134, at 659.
147 Broderick & Loos, supra note 127, at 1042. However, others believed that
taking the issue to ICAO would result in "enough veto, or stagnation, or simply inertia to
kill th[e] initiative stone dead." Comment, Safety in Isolation, 146 FLIGHT INT'L 3,
(Sept. 14, 1994).
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the SARPs should be honored, it was believed that no single
nation should be their policeman, since multilateral cooperation
was preferable to unilateral insistence. 148  Article 55 gives the
Council the authority to investigate "any situation which may
appear to present avoidable obstacles to the development of
international air navigation."'
' 49
In response, 150 in 1994, the ICAO General Assembly passed
Resolution A32-11, which established ICAO's Safety Oversight
Programme (SOP) to assess member state compliance with SARPs
and to assist states whose compliance was deficient.'51 Under the
SOP, ICAO began to review member states' aviation safety
regulation and oversight systems."5 By 1997, SOP assessments
had revealed that although 75% of member states had laws
establishing a CAA, only 51% had given it adequate legal status,
29% had adequate funding, 22% had adequate staffing and
qualified inspectors, and 13% had adequate inspector training.153
At the same time, however, the SOP was criticized because of
its voluntary, under-funded, and confidential nature.154 ICAO was
reticent to publicize delinquency for fear that member states would
resist the voluntary audit program. But, this confidentiality
violated the articles of the Chicago Convention.'55 Article 38 of
the Chicago Convention requires both member state notification of
noncompliance to the Council and the Council's notification
148 Safety in Isolation, supra note 147, at 3.
149 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 55(e). The triggering language requires
a request of the Council by a contracting state. Id.
150 "It is evident that the U.S. unilateral action became a potent catalyst for ICAO to
understand that continuing lethargic attitudes to aviation safety are not tolerable to a
large segment of the ICAO membership and to focus ICAO's attention to real priorities."
Milde, supra note 2, at 12.
151 Jacques Ducrest, Legislative and Quasi-Legislative Functions ofICAO: Towards
Improved Efficiency, 20 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 343, 357-58 (1995).
152 That same year the European Union began its Safety Assessment of Foreign
Airlines [SAFAI. Cameron, supra note 146, Two years earlier, ICAO had declined a
U.S. request that ICAO perform safety audits of States whose flag carriers served the
U.S. Id.
153 Broderick & Loos, supra note 127, at 1049.
154 Id. Saba, supra note 7, at 544.
155 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 38.
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thereof to all member states. 156 In addition, Article 54 requires the
Council to notify member states of "any infraction of this
Convention, as well as any failure to carry out recommendations
or determinations of the Council."' 157 Thus, the confidentiality of
the SARPs violations manifestly violated these explicit
requirements. 58  Moreover, by 1999, IASA had concluded that
40% of the countries assessed had deficient safety oversight
systems. 159
In response, ICAO replaced the SOP with a more meaningful
mandatory Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme
(U.S.OAP) in 1999. U.S.OAP safety audits began by evaluating
member sate compliance with Annexes 1, 6, and 8.16' For
example, the ICAO safety audit of the United States government
focused on the following issues and found substantive deficiencies
in U.S. laws and procedures vis-d-vis the SARPs obligations:
* Whether there is a clear policy covering the regulation of
airworthiness, operations, and personnel licensing;
" Whether an appropriate system is in place for the
certification of commercial aircraft operators and the
approval of maintenance organizations;
" Whether periodic training is given to inspectors and
licensing personnel, and whether appropriate training
records are maintained;
" Whether appropriate reference material, including ICAO
documentation, is available;
" Whether provisions existed for the revocation of licenses
and certificates if unsafe conditions are identified; and
" Whether adequate budgetary arrangements exist to enable
the CAA to carry out its obligations and responsibilities in
the most efficient and effective manner.
161
156 Id.
157 Id. arts. 54(j), 54(k).
158 Id. arts. 38, 54(j), 54(k).
159 Saba, supra note 7, at 542.
160 See Safety Oversight Audit Manual, ICAO Doc. 9735 (2000).
161 ICAO UNIVERSAL SAFETY OVERSIGHT AUDIT PROGRAMME: Confidential Final
Audit Report of the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States, at
http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/finrep.doc (last visited April 26, 2004). These, in fact, were
the criteria under which the U.S. aviation safety program was evaluated. Id. ICAO
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The following year, the FAA amended IASA to "make use of
other sources of information on CAA compliance with minimum
international standards for safety oversight."'162  These "other
sources" would include ICAO and the European Joint Aviation
Authorities (JAA), among others. 63  Hence, once ICAO finally
began pursuing mandatory, transparent safety audits, the United
States was willing to pay them deference.
By 2004, ICAO had audited 181 states for safety compliance
and performed 120 audit follow-up missions. U.S.OAP had
significant impact on the issue of filing of differences. In the
bilateral Memorandum of Understandings signed between the
audited states and ICAO, as approved by the Council, all audited
differences "shall be deemed to have been notified to ICAO," and
ICAO incorporates these differences in the Supplements to its
Annexes, therefore notifying all ICAO member states. ICAO now
has a vast database for almost all contracting states with respect to
conformity and compliance with Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing),
Annex 6 (Operations), and Annex 8 (Airworthiness). This will
grow with the expansion of U.S.OAP to the other safety-related
Annexes in 2005. Specifically, the second round of U.S.OAP
audits will focus on implementation of the safety-related
provisions in Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing), Annex 6 (Operation
Of Aircraft), Annex 8 (Airworthiness of Aircraft), Annex 11 (Air
Traffic Services), 64 Annex 13 (Accident Investigation), 65 and
audits are conducted under the procedures set forth in Safety Oversight Audit Manual,
supra note 160, to determine whether the SARPs of Annexes 1, 6, and 8 as well as
related provisions in other Annexes and their relevant guidance material and practices
are being implemented. Id. The audit team typically reviews the national legislation
through which Annexes 1, 6, and 8 are followed. Id. In particular, they examine whether
the state has an adequate civil aviation safety organization, properly certifies and
oversees flight operations and aircraft airworthiness, ground and flight personnel
qualifications, training programs, and maintains a comprehensive safety awareness
system and procedures for accident prevention. Id.
162 Changes to the International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Program, 65
Fed. Reg. 33,752 (May 25, 2000) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 129).
163 The European Civil Aviation Conference also has implemented a program of
ramp inspections at the airports of its 41 member states.
164 International Standards and Recommended Practices: Air Traffic Services,
International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on International Civil Aviation,
Annex 1 1 (8th ed. 1987) [hereinafter Chicago Convention Annex 11].
165 International Standards and Recommended Practices: Aircraft Accident
Investigation, International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on International
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Annex 14 (Aerodromes). 166  Moreover, the 35th meeting of the
ICAO General Assembly in 2004 passed a resolution requiring the
Secretary General to make the results of the audit available to all
member states, and to post them on the secure portions of the
ICAO web site. 1
67
The principal deficiencies discovered by the initial FAA and
ICAO safety audit program were: (1) the absence of basic aviation
laws; (2) the failure of CAAs to enforce safety laws and
regulations; and, (3) the failure of national laws to conform to the
standards set forth in the Chicago Convention Annexes.
168
Deficiencies related to the SARPs included:
Improper and insufficient inspections by State authorities
before the certification of air operators; maintenance
organizations and aviation training schools; licenses and
certificates improperly issued, validated, and renewed
without due process; procedures and documents
improperly approved; failure to identify safety concerns;
and failure to follow-up on identified safety deficiencies
and take remedial action to resolve such concerns.169
As can be expected, a tragic turn of events often leads to the
quick passage and implementation of changes to existing laws. "In
the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the 33rd
ICAO General Assembly passed several resolutions strongly
condemning the use of aircraft as weapons of mass destruction."'
' 70
Civil Aviation, Annex 13 (6th ed. 1981). See generally Samantha Sharif, The Failure of
Aviation Safety in New Zealand: An Examination of New Zealand's Implementation of
Its International Obligations Under Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation, 68 J. AIR L. & CoM. 339 (2003); Evan P. Singer, Recent
Developments In Aviation Safety: Proposals to Reduce the Fatal Accident Rate and the
Debate Over Data Protection, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 499, 506 (2002); and, Col. Luis E.
Ortiz & Dr. Griselda Capaldo, Can Justice Use Technical And Personal Information
Obtained Through Aircraft Accident Investigations?, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 263, 272-77
(2000) (recommending certain amendments to Annex 13).
166 International Standards and Recommended Practices: Aerodromes, International
Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 14 (8th
ed. 1983).
167 ICAO Assemb. Res. 16.2/1 (2004) (superseding Assemb. Res. 33-8).
168 Cameron, supra note 146, at 62.
169 Saba, supra note 7, at 544.
170 IACO Assemb. Res. A33-1, A33-2, A33-3 and A33-4, ICAO, 33rd Sess., at 1-
13. It was also recommended that Annex 17 be applied to domestic air transportation,
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One such resolution called upon ICAO to establish a security audit
program modeled on U.S.OAP.'7 ' As a result, ICAO inaugurated
the Universal Security Audit Programme (U.S.AP) to assess state
compliance with Annex 17 (Security),"7 ' an issue that took on
greater urgency after the tragic events of September 11, 2001.173
ICAO has recognized that, for economic reasons, many states
simply cannot comply without significant technical and economic
assistance dedicated to improving navigation facilities and
equipment, 174 training and personnel, and laws and regulations.'75
ICAO has also attempted to facilitate improvements in safety by
establishing the International Financial Facility for Aviation
Safety (IFFAS). IFFAS seeks to provide developing nations with
financial assistance in meeting their international legal obligations
in the arena of aviation safety, particularly those deficiencies
identified in the U.S.OAP audits. 76 The major problem, however,
was proper funding for IFFAS. 177 Some states also began to pool
their resources, creating regional organizations, such as the Central
American Corporation for Air Navigation Services (COCESNA)
to oversee safety. 178
IV. The Substantive Aviation Safety Obligations Under
International and Domestic Law
As noted above, soon after the United States and ICAO began
to audit state compliance, it was discovered that some states either
the first time that ICAO had strayed into the domestic arena. See Dempsey, The Role of
the International Civil Aviation Organization, supra note 5, at 689-90.
171 See Michael Milde, Aviation Safety Oversight: Audits and the Law, 26 ANNALS
OF AIR& SPACE L. 165, 175 (2001).
172 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, Annex 17; see Milde, supra note 171, at
177.
173 Dempsey, The Role of the International Civil Aviation Organization, supra note
5, at 649.
174 BUERGENTHAL, supra note 29, at 112.
175 Saba, supra note 7, at 549-51.
176 IACO, Assemb. Res. A33-10, ICAO, 33da Sess., at 35-37. See Saba, supra note
7, at 572. R.I.R. Abeyratne, Funding an International Financial Facility for
International Safety, 28 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 1, 5 (2002).
177 Saba, supra note 7, at 573.
178 On the development of regional initiatives to address aviation safety, see Saba,
supra note 7, at 548; Barreto, supra note 134, at 672-75; Abeyratne, supra note 1, at 133.
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had not established a civil aviation code or regulatory agency or
had promulgated legal and regulatory requirements that fell short
of the SARPs. 7 9  ICAO noted that states should develop
comprehensive legislation and regulations implementing the
SARPs or "select a comprehensive and detailed code established
by another Contracting State."' 8 °
The U.S. Department of Transportation has the authority to
assist foreign nations in improving aviation safety. 8' In order to
assist states in achieving compliance, the FAA drafted a model
Civil Aviation Safety Act (CASA) and model aviation
regulations,'82 based in part on U.S. aviation statutes 183 and
regulations.'84 The model CASA and model regulations are both
179 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, Annex 8.
180 Id.
181 49 U.S.C. § 40113(e) (2004).
182 Barreto, supra note 134, at 662-64.
183 The principal aviation statutory provisions of the United States are found in Title
49 of the United States Code, known as the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The relevant
statutory provisions governing civil aviation are set forth in 49 U.S.C. §§101-727 (1994);
49 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1155 (2004) (Subtitle II - Other Government Agencies, Chapter 11 -
National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB]); 49 U.S.C. §§5101-5127 (Subtitle III -
General and Intermodal Programs, Chapter 51 - Transportation of Hazardous Material);
49 U.S.C. §§40101-46507 (2004) (Subtitle VII - Aviation Programs (Part A - Air
Commerce and Safety).
184 In part, these model regulations tracked many of the requirements set forth in the
FAA's own comprehensive safety regulations:
4 C.F.R. Part 1 (2004) (Definitions and Abbreviations)
14 C.F.R. Part 21 (2004) (Certification Procedures for Products and Parts)
14 C.F.R. Part 23 (2004) (Airworthiness Standards: Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and
Commuter Category Airplanes)
14 C.F.R. Part 25 (2004) (Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes)
14 C.F.R. Part 27 (2004) (Airworthiness Standards: Normal Category Rotorcraft)
14 C.F.R. Part 29 (2004) (Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Rotorcraft)
14 C.F.R. Part 31 (2004) (Airworthiness Standards: Manned Free Balloons)
14 C.F.R. Part 33 (2004) (Airworthiness Standards: Aircraft Engines)
14 C.F.R. Part 35 (2004) (Airworthiness Standards: Propellers)
14 C.F.R. Part 43 (2004) (Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding, and
Alteration)
14 C.F.R. Part 45 (2004) (Identification and Registration Marking)
14 C.F.R. Part 47 (2004) (Aircraft Registration)
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posted on the FAA website.8 5
Model statutes are often a means of achieving uniformity. In
few areas is the achievement of uniformity as important as in
international civil aviation. Two aircraft operating in the same
airspace, under two different standards, procedures, rules and
regulations, could collide, killing the crew and passengers aboard.
The following is a descriptive summary of the international legal
requirements in the Chicago Convention and Annexes, the
proposed domestic legislation of the model CASA, and the
requirements under U.S. domestic law.
14 C.F.R. Part 61 (2004) (Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground
Instructors)
14 C.F.R. Part 63 (2004) (Certification: Flight Crewmembers Other Than Pilots)
14 C.F.R. Part 65 (2004) (Certification: Airmen other than Flight Crewmembers)
14 C.F.R. Part 67 (2004) (Medical Standards and Certification)
14 C.F.R. Part 91 (2004) (General Operating and Flight Rules)
14 C.F.R. Part 97 (2004) (Standard Instrument Approach Procedures)
14 C.F.R. Part 119 (2004) (Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators)
14 C.F.R. Part 121 (2004) (Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and
Supplemental Operations)
14 C.F.R. Part 125 (2004) (Certification and Operations: Airplanes Having a Seating
Capacity of 20 or more Passengers or a Maximum Payload Capacity of 6,000 Pounds
or more; and Rules Governing Persons On Board Such Aircraft)
14 C.F.R. Part 129 (2004) (Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators
of U.S.-Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage)
14 C.F.R. Part 133 (2004) (Rotorcraft Extemal-Load Operations)
14 C.F.R. Part 135 (2004) (Operating Requirements: Commuter and On Demand
Operations and Rules Governing Persons On Board Such Aircraft)
14 C.F.R. Part 137 (2004) (Agricultural Aircraft Operations)
14 C.F.R. Part 141 (2004) (Pilot Schools)
14 C.F.R. Part 142 (2004) (Training Centers)
14 C.F.R. Part 145 (2004) (Repair Stations)
14 C.F.R. Part 147 (2004) (Aviation Maintenance Technician Schools)
14 C.F.R. Part 183 (2004) (Representatives of the Administrator)
t85 Civil Aviation Safety Act of 2002, version 2.3 (Oct. 2002),
http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/CAL.doc (last visited April 26, 2004) [hereinafter CASA];
Model Aviation Regulatory Document, version 2.3, http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/calr.htm
(last visited April 26, 2004).
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A. Civil Aviation Authority: Establishment and
Administration
The CASA establishes an autonomous Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA). The CAA shall exercise its responsibilities
consistent with the "public interest," defined as "the promotion,
encouragement, development and regulation of civil aviation so as
to best promote safety."'
' 86
The CAA is headed by a Director of Civil Aviation appointed
by the Head of State with the advice and consent of the legislative
body for a term of a specified number of years, removable only for
cause. "'87 Qualifications of the Director are: (1) fitness for the
discharge of the agency's responsibilities; (2) significant
management or similar technical experience in a field directly
related to aviation; and (3) the absence of any financial interest in
any aeronautical enterprise, and other employment. 1'88 No CAA
employee may participate in any proceeding in which the Director
has a financial interest.
189
The Director's primary responsibility is to "encourage and
foster the safe development of civil aviation . ,.9' The Director
has specific authority to:
* Develop, plan for, and formulate policy with respect to the
use of the navigable airspace;' 9'
" acquire, establish, operate, and improve air navigation
facilities;
192
* prescribe air traffic rules and regulations;'93
* regulate aviation security;
194
186 CASA, supra note 185, § 202.
187 Id. § 201(a). Protecting the Director of Civil Aviation from removal prior to the
end of his term is necessary to ensure that he is free to make decisions shielded from
political retribution.
188 Id. § 203. These requirements attempt to ensure that the person chosen for the
position is qualified and less likely to have ethical problems while in office.
189 Id. § 801(b). These ethical requirements are designed to ensure that
decisionmaking is objective, and not influenced by the decisionmaker's financial benefit.
190 Id. § 406.
191 Id. § 407(a).
192 Id. § 408.
193 Id. § 409.
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* establish training schools;'95
* investigate accidents and take any corrective action necessary
to prevent similar accidents in the future;' 96
" certify and inspect aircraft, airmen, and air operators;
97
" validate the certification and inspection actions of another
state;19
8
• prevent flights by unairworthy aircraft or unqualified
airmen; '99
* regulate the transportation of dangerous goods;2 °° and
" maintain a system of the national registration of civil
aircraft.2"'
The Director is given certain administrative authority on behalf of
the CAA to acquire property,202 enter into contracts for services,2"3
exchange information with foreign governments,2 4 and delegate
authority to a subordinate.2 5
The U.S. aviation market is sufficiently large that it requires
four agencies to administer various aspects of aviation. The
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) °6 handles aircraft
accident investigations mandated under Annex 6207 and appeals
194 Id. § 410.
195 Id. § 411.
196 Id. § 412.
197 Id. § 413.
198 Id. § 414.
199 Id. § 416.
200 Id. § 417.
201 Id. § 501(a).
202 Id. § 302.
203 Id. § 303.
204 Id. § 304.
205 Id. § 305.
206 Federal Aviation Act 49 U.S.C. § 1101, Annex VI. 49 C.F.R Parts 800-831
(2004).
207 49 U.S.C. §§ 1131-32 (2004). The NTSB describes its responsibilities as
follows:
The [NTSB] is the agency charged with fulfilling the obligations of the United
States under Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation (Eighth Edition, July 1994), and does so consistent with State
Department requirements and in coordination with that department. Annex 13
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decisions of the Administrator of the FAA.2"8 Though it has no
authority to issue regulation, the NTSB does have the
responsibility to make regulatory recommendations to the FAA to
avoid future accidents. °9  The Transportation Security
Administration of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
regulates aviation security.210  The Office of the Secretary of
Transportation has jurisdiction over economic regulatory issues
such as airline financial fitness, competition policy, and consumer
protection.21' The Secretary of Transportation is statutorily
commanded to assign and maintain safety as "the highest priority
in air commerce. 2 12
The FAA was established by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
and subsequently became a part of the U.S. Department of
Transportation upon its creation in 1967.213 The FAA is headed by
contains specific requirements for the notification, investigation, and reporting
of certain incidents and accidents involving international civil aviation. In the
case of an accident or incident in a foreign state involving civil aircraft of U.S.
registry or manufacture, where the foreign state is a signatory to Annex 13 to
the Chicago Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization, the
state of occurrence is responsible for the investigation. If the accident or
incident occurs in a foreign state not bound by the provisions of Annex 13 to the
Chicago Convention, or if the accident or incident involves a public aircraft
(Annex 13 applies only to civil aircraft), the conduct of the investigation shall
be in consonance with any agreement entered into between the United States
and the foreign state.
Accident/Incident Investigation Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 3806 (Jan. 27, 1997) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 831).
208 49 U.S.C. § 1133 (2004).
209 DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION, supra note 23, at § 12.67.
210 Dempsey, Aviation Security, supra note 6, at 717-19.
211 For a review of the legislation passed by the United States to address aviation
security, see Dempsey, Aviation Security, supra note 6, at 691-719 and DEMPSEY, LAW
& FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra note 23, at 287.
212 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(1) (2004).
213 49 U.S.C. subtitle I (2004). In the mid-1950s, a series of accidents brought to
the surface an underlying need for significant safety enhancement in aviation. In 1956, a
Trans World Airlines Constellation collided with a United Airlines' DC-7 over the
Grand Canyon. In early 1957, a Douglas Aircraft company-owned DC-7 collided with
an Air Force F-89 over Sunland, California. The DC-7 crashed into a junior high school,
killing three and injuring seventy others. In 1958, a third significant accident involved
the collision of a United Airlines' DC-7 and an Air Force F-100 near Las Vegas,
Nevada. Congress reacted with the promulgation of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
Pub. L. 85-726; 49 U.S.C. § 1300 et seq., and the creation of the Federal Aviation
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
an Administrator, appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and serves for a term of five years.21 4 The
FAA Administrator is required to consider the maintenance and
enhancement of safety and security as among the highest priorities
in the public interest.215  The FAA is charged with promoting
aviation safety, ensuring the safe and efficient utilization of the
national airspace, 216 and providing oversight of the U.S. airport
system.2 7 Although it does not own and operate airports (they are
owned and operated by local institutions),218 the FAA issues
airport operating certificates, regulates them, and provides
financial support to them. 2 9 The FAA handles all other aspects of
airman, aircraft, airport, and airline safety as well as providing air
traffic control and navigation services. 20 Under U.S. law, actions
of the Secretary of Transportation and of the FAA Administrator
Agency (later to become the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the
Department of Transportation Act of 1966). The accident investigation and
recommendation responsibilities of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, which had been
created in 1938, were transferred to the FAA initially and were re-delegated to the
National Transportation Safety Board, made independent in 1974. PAUL STEPHEN
DEMPSEY & LAURENCE GESELL, AIR TRANSPORTATION: FOUNDATIONS FOR THE 2 1sT
CENTURY 229-31 (1997); ROBERT HARDAWAY, AIRPORT REGULATION, LAW AND PUBLIC
POLICY 19, 21 (1991).
214 The five-year term was added in an FAA Appropriations Bill in 1996 in order to
give the agency some stability. Theretofore, the agency had been headed by a string of
Administrators, and therefore it had been denied continuity of leadership.
215 49 U.S.C. VII, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2004).
216 Navigation of U.S. airspace by foreign air carriers is governed by 40 U.S. §
41703 (2004).
217 The FAA Administrator is charged with:
* promoting aviation safety;
* promoting aviation security;
* ensuring the safe and efficient utilization of the national
airspace;
* overseeing of the U.S. airport system; and
* supporting national defense requirements.
218 See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, Local Airport Regulation: The Constitutional
Tension Between Police Power, Preemption & Takings, 11 PENN. ST. ENVT'L L. REv. 1
(2002) (discussing the tension between local and federal regulation of aviation and
airports).
219 49 U.S.C. § 44706 (2004); 14 C.F.R Parts 71-109.
220 DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION, supra note 23, §§ 12.48-12.54.
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must be consistent with the international obligations imposed by
the Chicago Convention.221
The FAA has broad authority to conduct investigations.222 The
Administrator may delegate authority for issuance of pertinent
orders, directives, and instructions.2 1 Given the size of
commercial and general aviation in the United States, many
investigatory and oversight functions have been delegated, of
necessity, to subordinate institutions224 and private persons.22' The
FAA Administrator also holds broad rulemaking authority.226
B. Agency Procedures
Under the CASA, the Director of Civil Aviation is given broad
221 49 U.S.C. § 40105(b) (2004).
222 DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION, supra note 24, § 12.04.
223 49 U.S.C. § 106(f)(2)(c) (2004); 14 C.F.R Part 11-B Procedural Rules.
224 Within the FAA, the safety oversight activities have been delegated to the
Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification (AVR). Its principal
organizational units are:
" Flight Standard Services (AFS) - personnel licensing, certification and
surveillance of operators and the airworthiness related to air carrier operations and
aircraft maintenance;
" Aircraft Certification Services (AIR) - airworthiness activities related to design
and manufacturing;
" Office of Aviation Medicine (AAM) - medical certification of aviation personnel,
research, occupational health, and substance abuse abatement.
The AFS oversees the region's airlines, establishes requirements for instrument
procedures and flight inspection and coordinates these requirements with FAA
headquarters in Washington, D.C. The AFS secures compliance with FAA regulations,
programs, standards, and procedures governing the inspection, certification, and
surveillance of commercial and general aviation. It also examines, certifies and oversees
flight and ground personnel, examiners, and air agencies. Within each region, field
activities are performed by the Flight Standard District Offices (FSDO), which are
responsible for the day-to-day administration of the licensing process. See generally,
DEMPSEY ET AL., Aviation Law and Regulation, supra note 23, § 12.04.
225 The FAA delegates certain certification and surveillance responsibilities to
private persons under 14 C.F.R. Part 183. The FAA Administrator has broad authority to
enter into contracts to fulfill its mandate. 49 U.S.C. § 106(l)(6) (2004).
226 The FAA Administrator has discretion to issue such regulations, standards, and
procedures as the agency deems appropriate. 49 U.S.C. § 40113(a) (2004). The
Administrator is authorized to issue, rescind, and revise such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the FAA's mission. 49 U.S.C.§ 40106(0(3) (2004).
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legal authority.227 Subject to the requirements set forth in the
national Administrative Procedures Act,228 the Director has the
authority to conduct investigations,229 take depositions and other
evidence,23° and issue subpoenas.23 ' The Director may also issue
orders, rules, and regulations, so long as they meet the minimum
requirements of the Chicago Convention Annexes, 23 2 to take effect
within a reasonable time.233 Before the Director amends, modifies,
suspends, or revokes any certificate, the Director shall notify the
holder thereof and afford the holder the opportunity to be heard.234
The right to be represented by an attorney is also conferred. 3
Adverse decisions may be appealed by the certificate holder.236
The Director has broad authority to temporarily dispense with
due process requirements under circumstances when it is essential
in the interest of safety to meet an emergency. 237 The Director
also possesses the authority to grant exemptions from the CAA's
rules and regulations if such exemption is consistent with the
"public interest. ' ,238 The Director may exempt foreign aircraft and
airmen from certification requirements or operating restrictions.239
The Director has certain transparency requirements, including
227 CASA, supra note 185.
228 Id. § 403.
229 Id. § 802(b).
230 Id. § 803(d).
231 Id. §§ 401(c), 803(b).
232 Chicago Convention, supra note 10.
233 CASA, supra note 185, § 402(a). Procedurally, the FAA usually prepares a
Notice of Proposed Rule Making setting forth the proposed rule and reasons therefore.
The NPRM is then published in the Federal Register to allow public comment during a
period of 60 to 120 days. Thereafter, a final rule is published in the Federal Register at
least thirty days before its entry into force. Exceptions to this process may be imposed in
emergency situations. 49 C.F.R Part 11.
234 CASA, supra note 185, § 6 10(c).
235 Id. § 801(c).
236 Id. §§ 601(d), 806. The decision shall be stayed unless the Director informs the
court that an emergency exists and safety requires the immediate effectiveness of the
order. CASA § 601(d). Upon review, the facts shall be conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. Id. § 806(d).
237 Id. § 402(b).
238 Id. § 405(a).
239 Id. § 611(b).
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the responsibility to publish "all reports, orders, decisions, rules
and regulations" issued under the CASA.24° Every official act
must be entered into the record, and the proceedings must be open
to the public, unless the Director determines that public disclosure
would be contrary to the national interest.241
In the United States, federal agencies are subject to the
constitutional requirement of providing due process of law prior to
the deprivation of liberty and property.2 4 The Administrative
Procedure Act243 requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, in
most cases, before one is deprived of a governmental entitlement,
such as an operating license.2" With some exceptions, federal
agencies such as the FAA are also subject to certain transparency
laws. This includes the Government in the Sunshine Act, 45 which
ordinarily requires their meetings to be open to the public, as well
as the Freedom of Information Act,246 which ordinarily requires
that agencies make available their internal documents available to
the public upon demand.2 47 Exceptions exist for various reasons,
including national security.24
The FAA also holds broad emergency powers to suspend or
revoke various operating and airworthiness licenses and
certificates. 49 At various times, it has used such power to suspend
operations of a certain aircraft type,25 to suspend operations of an
airline,' or to suspend the operations of the entire airline
240 Id. § 401(b).
241 Id. § 801(d).
242 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
243 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2004).
244 Id.




249 49 U.S.C. § 40106 (2004) (Emergency Powers).
250 Id. For example, in 1979, after a crash in Chicago, the FAA grounded all DC- 10
aircraft until it could determine the cause and prescribe a remedy.
251 ValuJet began operations in October 1993 with three aircraft. By 1996, it flew a
fleet of 53 aircraft. On May 11, 1996, an oxygen canister exploded in the cargo hold in
ValuJet Flight 592, causing it to crash in the Everglades and kill all 110 persons aboard.
The FAA then accelerated and intensified its Special Emphasis Review of the carrier's
operations which had begun the preceding February. In June 1996, ValuJet entered into
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industry.252 Certain decisions rendered, or sanctions imposed, in
the United States by the Administrator may be appealed to the
NTSB.253 For example, the FAA Administrator's decision to deny
airman certification may be appealed to the NTSB.254 Decisions of
the NTSB may, in turn, be appealed to a U.S. Court of Appeals.255
The FAA Administrator may promulgate regulations, and grant
exemptions from them.256
C. Personnel Licensing
Article 32 of the Chicago Convention requires that member
states issue certificates of competency and licenses to the pilot and
operating crew of every aircraft registered in said state and flown
in international aviation.257 With respect to flights above its
territories, each state may refuse to recognize such certificates and
licenses issued by another state to its own nationals. 8
Article 33 provides that certificates of competency and
licenses shall be recognized as valid by other contracting states so
long as the requirements under which they were issued were equal
to or greater than the minimum standards established by ICAO.259
First adopted in 1948, Annex 1 to the Chicago Convention
a Consent Order with the FAA under which ValuJet agreed to suspend its operations and
provide information demonstrating its qualifications to hold FAA operating authority.
On August 29, 1996, the FAA returned the carrier's FAA operating certificate to it. See
Application of ValuJet Airlines, DOT Order 96-9-36 (1996); Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Predation, Competition & Antitrust Law: Turbulence in the Airline Industry, 67 J. AIR L.
& COM. 685, 688 (2002).
252 After four commercial aircraft were commandeered by Al-Qaeda operatives on
the morning of September 11, 2001 (two were flown into the New York World Trade
Center and one into the Arlington, Va., Pentagon) the FAA issued an emergency order
grounding all commercial aircraft from flying for three days. Dempsey, Aviation
Security, supra note 6, at 712.
253 49 U.S.C. § 1133 (2004).
254 49 U.S.C. § 44703 (2004); DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION,
supra note 23, §§ 12.02, 12.08
255 49 U.S.C. § 1153 (2004); DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION, supra
note 23, § 12.09.
256 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(2) (2004).
257 Article 29 requires that flight crew members carry their licenses on board the
aircraft they fly. Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 29.
258 Id. art. 32.
259 Id. art. 33.
[Vol. 30
AVIATION SAFETY
addresses personnel licensing.26 ° Under it, no one may act as a
flight crewmember without a valid license in compliance with the
Annex.26' To secure a license or type rating,262 the applicant must
satisfy age,263 knowledge,264 experience,265 flight instruction,266 and
skill267 requirements. 268 The licensing process also must include a
269medical fitness evaluation. Similar requirements are established
for flight navigators, flight engineers,270 and aircraft maintenance
personnel.27'
Under the CASA, an "airman" is defined as a flight crew
member (the person in command of the aircraft, the pilot, or
navigator), mechanic (the person in charge of the inspection,
maintenance, overhaul, or repair of aircraft or aircraft engines,
propellers, or appliances), and the flight operations officer.272 No
one may serve in any capacity as an airman unless he holds an
airman certificate and, once issued, the holder may not violate its
terms and conditions.273 An airman certificate may be issued "if
the Director finds, after investigation, that such person possesses
the proper qualifications for, and is physically able to, perform the
duties pertaining to the possibility for which the airman certificate
260 Chicago Convention Annex 1, supra note 33.
261 Id. § 1.2.1.
262 Type ratings are established for aircraft and for operating an aircraft under
instrument flight rules (IFR). The second-in-command of an aircraft requiring more than
a single pilot must also hold a type rating for that aircraft. Id. § 2.1.7.
263 The minimum age is 17 years. Id. § 2.3.1.1. The minimum age for commercial
pilots is 18 years. Id. § 2.4.1.1. The minimum age for an airline transport pilot license is
21 years. Id. § 2.5.1.1.
264 Id. §§ 2.3.1.2, 2.4.1.2, 2.5.1.2.
265 The applicant may not have less than 40 hours of flight time. Id. § 2.3.1.3.
Applicants for a commercial pilots' license must have 200 hours of flight time, or 150
hours if completed during a course of approved training. Id. § 2.4.1.3.1. Applicants for
an airline transport pilot license must have 1,500 hours of flight time.
266 Id. §§ 2.3.1.4, 2.4.1.4, 2.5.1.4.
267 Id. §§ 2.3.1.5, 2.4.1.5, 2.5.1.5.
268 Id., §§ 2.1.1.3, 2.4.1.6, 2.5.1.6.
269 Id. § 1.2.4.
270 Id. arts. 17-21.
271 id. arts. 22-28.
272 CASA, supra note 185, § 102(b)(6).
273 Id. § 611(a)(2).
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is sought . ,,274 The airman certificate shall contain such terms
and conditions, and physical fitness tests as necessary to assure
civil aviation safety.275 Certificates need not be issued to foreign
nationals.276 Airmen have an affirmative obligation to comply
with the requirements of the CASA and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder.277
The FAA issues all licenses specified in Annex 1 and validates
foreign licenses. 27 ' After investigation, if it is found that the
applicant is physically able... to perform the duties required for the
airman certification and possesses the appropriate qualifications,
the Secretary will issue a certificate designating the capacity in
which the applicant is authorized to operate and the class,
restrictions, and aircraft types for which certification is valid.80
The certificate specifies the terms, conditions, duration, physical
fitness test, and any other qualifications deemed necessary in the
interest of safety.281 The FAA may prohibit a foreign national
from receiving an airman certificate or condition receipt upon
274 Id. § 601(b).
275 Id. § 602(c).
276 Id. § 602(d).
277 Id. § 608(c).
278 In the United States, certification of airmen is governed by 14 C.F.R Part 61.
(Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors), Part 63 (Certification:
Flight Crew members other than Pilots), Part 65 (Certification: Airmen Other Than
Flight Crew members), Part 67 (Medical Standards and Certification), and 14 C.F.R. 141
(Pilot Schools). These are complemented by FAA handbooks, such as FAA Order
8710.3C - Pilot Examiner's Handbook, FAA Order 1380.53.D - Staffing Guide:
Certification Engineers & Flight Test Pilot; FAA Order 3000.22 - Air Traffic Services
Training; FAA Order 3120.4J - Air Traffic Technical Training; FAA Order 3140.1 -
Flight Standards Service National Training Program; FAA Order 3930.3 - Air Traffic
Control Specialist Health Program FAA Order 7220.1A - Certification and Rating
procedures (ATC) FAA Order 8080.6B - Conduct of Airmen Knowledge Tests. FAA
designated Aeronautical Medical Examiners (AME) conduct medical certification
pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 97, and the FAA Aeromedical Certification Manual.
279 The applicant must hold an FAA airman medical certificate. DEMPSEY ET AL.,
Aviation Law & Regulation, supra note 23, § 12.11-12.13.
280 49 U.S.C. § 44703 (2004). For example, mechanics and repairmen hold a
different certification than do pilots. DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION,
supra note 23, § 12.32-12.34.
281 49 U.S.C. § 44703 (2004). DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION,




D. Aircraft Airworthiness Certification
Article 31 of the Chicago Convention requires that every
aircraft flown internationally must be provided with a certificate of
airworthiness by the state in which it is registered.283 Under
Article 33, such certificates of airworthiness must be recognized
by other states, provided that the requirements under which they
were issued met or exceeded ICAO SARPs.2 84 Article 12 of the
Chicago Convention requires every state to adopt rules of the air
to insure that aircraft flying over its territory, and aircraft carrying
its nationality mark, will comply with the laws regulating the
flight and maneuver of aircraft there in force.285
Article 83bis of the Chicago Convention entered into force on
June 20, 1997. It provides that when the owner of a leased,
chartered, or interchanged aircraft has his principal place of
business or permanent residence in another state, the state of
registry may delegate to the state of the operator those functions
that that state of registry can more properly perform, if it so
consents to such delegation.286
Annexes 6 and 8 address aircraft operation and
airworthiness. 287  First adopted in 1948, Annex 6 addresses the
"Operation of Aircraft.2 88  Its provisions go beyond flight
282 49 U.S.C. § 44711.
283 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 31.
284 Id. art. 33.
285 Article 30 of the Chicago Convention provides that aircraft operating in
international aviation may carry radio equipment only if a license to install and operate it
has been issued by the state in which the aircraft is registered, and only used by flight
crew. The use of such equipment shall be governed by the state over which the aircraft
is flown. Id. art. 30.
286 Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation [Art. 83bis] (Oct. 6, 1980), ICAO Doc. 1318, reprinted in 18 ANNALS OF AIR &
SPACE L. 149 (1993). See generally R.I.R ABEYRATNE, AvIATION IN CRISIS 109-12
(2004); Benoit Verhaegen, The Entry Into Force of Article 83bis: Legal Perspectives in
Terms of Safety Oversight, 22 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 269, 271-73 (1997).
287 Chicago Convention Annex 6, supra note 36; Chicago Convention Annex 8,
supra, note 37.
288 Annex 6 is divided into three parts: Part I - International Commercial Air
Transport - Aeroplanes; Part II - International General Aviation - Aeroplanes; and
Part III - International Operations - Helicopters. In the United States, 14 C.F.R Part
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operations,289 however, and include aircraft instruments and
equipment,29 maintenance,29 and security.292
Annex 8 addresses "Airworthiness of Aircraft" in detail,293
acknowledging that its requirements:
would not replace national regulations and that national codes of
airworthiness containing the full scope and extent of detail
considered necessary by individual States would be necessary as
the basis for the certification of individual aircraft. Each State
would establish its own comprehensive and detailed code of
airworthiness, or would select a comprehensive and detailed
code established by another Contracting State.294
The model CASA is such a code.
Annex 8 addresses flight performance,295 aircraft structures,
296
design and construction,297 engines,298 propellers,299 powerplants,3"
instruments and equipment,3 1  operating limitations,30 2  and
continuing airworthiness requirements.0 3  It requires that a
certificate of airworthiness be issued by the state on the basis of
satisfactory evidence that the aircraft complies with the relevant
airworthiness requirements. 3" To demonstrate airworthiness,
121- Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations






293 Annex 8 is divided into four parts: Definitions, Administration, Aeroplanes, and
Helicopters. Chicago Convention Annex 8, supra note 37.
294 Id.
295 Id. ch. 2.
296 Id. ch. 3.
297 Id. ch. 4.
298 Id. ch. 5.
299 Id. ch. 6.
300 Id. ch. 7.
301 Id. ch. 8.
302 Id. ch. 9.
303 Id. ch. 10. Similar requirements are imposed on helicopters. Id. Annex 8.
304 Id. § 3.1.
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there must be an "approved design" comprised of drawings,
specifications, reports, inspections, and flight testing.30 5 When a
certificate of airworthiness is based upon satisfactory evidence, a
subsequent state may rely on the earlier state's certification.
When a particular type of aircraft is first registered, the state
issuing the certificate is required to so advise the nation in which
the aircraft was designed, which shall, in turn, forward to the state
of registry any information it has found necessary to ensure
continued airworthiness or safety of that type of aircraft.30 6
Aircraft that have been damaged, have fallen into disrepair, or
have otherwise become less than airworthy shall not be flown until
they are airworthy again.30 7
Under the CASA, no one may lawfully operate an aircraft that
does not have an airworthiness certificate, nor may a certified
aircraft be operated in violation of its terms and conditions.30 8 An
airworthiness certificate may be issued if the aircraft conforms to
the appropriate type certificate and, after inspection, is found to be
in a safe condition.30 9 The Director of Civil Aviation has the
responsibility to inspect aircraft, engines, propellers, and
appliances, and, if they are found not to be airworthy, to prohibit
their use in civil aviation.310
The FAA holds broad authority to prescribe minimum
standards for the design, material, construction, quality of
assembly and performance of aircraft, engines, and propellers; it
may also issue type, production, and airworthiness certificates.
31
The FAA also certifies the airworthiness of aircraft,312 and
305 Id. §§ 3.1-3.3.
306 Id. §§ 4.2.1, 4.2.2.
307 Id. § 6.2.
308 CASA, supra note 185, § 611(a)(1).
309 Id. § 603(b).
310 Id. § 608.
311 49 U.S.C. §§ 44702 & 44704 (2004). DEMPSEY ET AL., Aviation Law &
Regulation, supra note 23, §§ 12.22-12.23.
312 Airworthiness functions of the FAA are provided by two services. The Aircraft
Certification Service (AIS) issues: (a) initial airworthiness certificates; (b) type
certificates, for new aircraft designs; (c) supplemental type certificates (STCs), for
design modifications to existing aircraft; and (d) production certificates, to authorize a
manufacturer to build an aircraft in accordance with an approved design. The Flight
Standards Service (AFS): (a) establishes certification standards for air carriers and
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
provides comprehensive inspection of aircraft and air operators.313
E. Nationality, Ownership, and Registration Requirements
The nationality of aircraft is addressed in Articles 17-21 of the
Chicago Convention." 4 Aircraft have the nationality of the state
in which they are registered3. 5 and may not be registered in more
than a single state.316 Aircraft must bear appropriate registration
and nationality marks.317
Aircraft nationality and registration marks are addressed by
Annex 7, first adopted by ICAO in 1949. It requires that
nationality, common, and registration marks be affixed to the
fuselage of the aircraft, and be visible at all times.318 The
nationality or common mark must be listed before the registration
mark.319 The letters must be in capital Roman type, numbers must
be in Arabic, of equal height, and without ornamentation.320
The CASA requires the Director to establish and maintain a
system of aircraft registration.3 21 An aircraft may be registered if it
is owned by citizens or the government of the country where
registry is sought and is not registered in another country.322 The
Director must also establish a national system for recording title in
aircraft and aircraft parts.323
commercial operators; (b) provides certification inspection and surveillance activities to
ensure proper aircraft maintenance; and (c) manages the systems for registry of civil
aircraft. DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION, supra note 23, §§ 12.18-12.21.
313 The FAA has developed two comprehensive handbooks - FAA Order 8400.10,
Air Transportation Operations Inspector's Handbook, and FAA Order 8700.1, General
Aviation Operations Inspector's Handbook - to guide its Aviation Safety Inspectors
(Operations).
314 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, arts. 17-21.
315 Id. art. 17.
316 Id. art. 18.
317 Id. art. 20.
318 International Standards: Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks,
International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on International Civil Aviation,
Annex 7, § 3.1 (4th ed. 1981).
319 Id. § 2.2.
320 Id. §§ 4, 5.1.
321 CASA, supra note 185, § 50 1(a).
322 Id. § 501(c).
323 Id. § 502.
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In the United States, no aircraft may be operated unless it is
registered at the FAA's Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City.
3 24
Eligibility for registration is limited to aircraft not registered in
another country,"' as well as those aircraft owned by U.S. citizens,permanent residents, and U.S. corporations.326
F. Air Carrier Operator Certification
Under the CASA, in promulgating standards, rules, and
regulations and in certificating air operators, the Director of Civil
Aviation must take into account the carrier's responsibility to
perform air transportation consistent with the "highest possible
degree of safety in the public interest., 327 One may not operate an
airline without an air operator certificate.328 Such a certificate
shall be issued if the applicant "is properly and adequately
equipped and has demonstrated the ability to conduct a safe
operation" consistent with the procedures, rules, and regulations
established by the CAA.329
Aircraft operators have an affirmative duty to maintain,
overhaul, and repair their equipment in a manner consistent with
CASA and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.33 °
They also have a duty to maintain operations consistent with such
regulatory requirements and the "public interest.', 31 They may not
employ an air operator who does not have a proper airman
332certificate, nor may they operate aircraft in contravention of any
rule, regulation, or certificate.333
324 49 U.S.C. § 44101 (2004).
325 See IAL Aircraft Holding v. Federal Aviation Administration, 206 F. 3 rd 1042,
1043 (2000).
326 49 U.S.C. § 44102 (2004). DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION,
supra note 23, § 12.30.
327 CASA, supra note 185, § 601(b).
328 Id. § 611(a)(4).
329 Id. § 604(b).
330 Id. § 608(a).
331 Id. § 608(b).
332 Id. § 611 (a)(3).
333 Id. § 611 (a)(5). Air operators must designate an agent for service of process. Id.
§ 804.
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The FAA may issue an air carrier operating certificate.334 The
FAA has established a Certification, Standardization, and
Evaluation Team (CSET) for the certification of commercial
airlines.335 An air carrier operator has significant responsibility to
"inspect, maintain, overhaul, and repair all aircraft.., in its
fleet.
336
G. Air Carrier Economic Regulation
At the Chicago Conference of 1944, the United States strongly
resisted conferring economic regulatory authority to an
international body. However, Article 44 of the Chicago
Convention provides that among ICAO's "aims and objectives" is
a responsibility to "prevent economic waste caused by
unreasonable competition." By and large, this mandate has laid
dormant, and ICAO has instead focused its efforts on the technical
issues of navigation, safety, and security.
The SARPs do not address economic regulatory issues. 3 7 The
CASA expresses ambivalence about economic regulation. It not
only includes a provision requiring air carriers to establish fitness
as a condition of entry, but CASA also encourages states to vest
such responsibility in an agency separate from the CAA.338
In the United States, although the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978 (ADA) eliminated the requirement that an applicant for
domestic operating authority prove the consistency of its proposed
operations with the "public convenience and necessity, ' 3 9 the
ADA in no way reduced the statutory burden that an applicant
prove that it is "fit, willing, and able to perform such
transportation properly and to conform to the provisions of this
chapter and the rules, regulations, and requirements of the
334 49 U.S.C. § 44705 (2004); 14 C.F.R pt. 121.
335 Airline oversight is provided by a dedicated Certificate Management Office
(CMO). The CMO oversees the Airline Transport Pilot License (ATPL) and Type
Ratings issued under 14 C.F.R. pt. 121. DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW &
REGULATION, supra note 23, § 12.40.
336 Id. § 12.27.
337 See, e.g., CHiNKiN, supra note 50, at 33.
338 CASA, supra note 185.
339 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board -
Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 137 (1979).
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[DOT].... ,,3 In determining whether a new applicant is fit, the
DOT assesses whether the applicant: (1) has the managerial and
operational ability to conduct the proposed operations; (2) has
sufficient financial resources available to commence operations
without undue risk; and (3) will comply with its statutory and
regulatory obligations under the law (or, in the regulatory
language often used, has demonstrated a satisfactory "compliance
disposition").34' In initial certification of an airline, the DOT
Office of the Secretary evaluates the financial, managerial, and
operational fitness of an applicant in determining whether it will
issue it a certificate of public convenience and necessity.342 The
fitness of foreign airlines is also evaluated before they are issued a
permit to serve points in the United States.343
Under what is commonly referred to as "section 402" of the
Federal Aviation Act, in order to serve the United States, a foreign
carrier must secure a permit.344 In order to receive a permit, an
340 The Federal Aviation Act requires DOT to find a carrier fit, willing, and able
before it issues it an operating certificate. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41101-41112 (2004). See 14
C.F.R. § 204 (2004). Fitness remains an ongoing requirement even after initial
certification. 49 U.S.C. § 41110(e). (2004).
341 See Application ofAir Illinois, Inc., DOT Order 86-2-25 (1986).
342 DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION, supra note 23, §§ 12.41-12.44.
343 Id. § 12.45
344 49 U.S.C. §§ 41301-07 (2004). The FAA regulations specifically require
compliance with Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention. 14 C.F.R. §§ 211.20, 211.21,
294.83 (2004). The FAA describes the process as follows:
The international requirements governing air safety are contained in the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180 (Chicago
Convention) and its related Annexes, primarily Annex 6 and Annex 8. A basic
precept of the international scheme is that sovereign states that accept the
Convention's obligations will comply with them.
If a particular foreign air carrier of a sovereign state desires to conduct foreign
air transportation operations into the United States, it must file an application
with the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) for a foreign air carrier
permit under section 402 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, or
for an exemption under section 416(b) of the Act. Parts 211 and 302 of the
Economic Regulations of OST (14 C.F.R. parts 211 and 302) prescribe the
requirements for issuance of these authorities. Consistently with international
law, certain safety requirements for operation into the United States are
prescribed by the FAA's part 129 (14 C.F.R. part 129). Before OST issues a
foreign air carrier permit or exemption, it notifies the FAA of the application
and request the FAA's evaluation of the applicant's capability for safe
operations. This practice and procedure has been in effect for many years. OST
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applicant must demonstrate that it is "fit, willing, and able" to
perform the proposed service, that it has been designated by the
government where it is registered to serve the route in question
under an applicable bilateral air transport agreement (or, in the
absence of bilateral rights, on the basis of comity and reciprocity),
and that issuance of the permit would be in the "public interest. ' 345
The DOT may impose any reasonable conditions, amendments, or
modifications to such permit once issued, or it may simply
suspend or revoke it.346 Once certificated, the FAA Administrator
has the authority to evaluate the ongoing technical and financial
capability of commercial airlines.347
H. Schools and Approved Maintenance Organizations
No ICAO Annex presently addresses aviation training
organizations.348 The CASA authorizes the examination and rating
of civilian flight, repair, and maintenance schools, as well as
Approved Maintenance Organizations.349
L Air Navigation Facilities
Air traffic control and flight information services are governed
by Annex 11 - Air Traffic Services.35 °  Under the CASA, the
Director of Civil Aviation may prescribe "minimum safety
standards for the operation of air navigation facilities."35' The
does not issue a foreign air carrier permit or exemption, and FAA does not issue
part 129 operations specifications unless the FAA is satisfied that a foreign air
carrier is capable of conducting safe operations within the United States.
Information Concerning FAA Procedures for Examining and Monitoring Foreign Air
Carriers, 57 Fed. Reg. 38342 (Aug. 24, 1992) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 119). In
issuing a § 402 permit, or an exemption to provide service under 49 U.S.C. § 41301
(2004), the DOT issues a boiler-plate order requiring that all aircraft serving the United
States satisfy Annex 6 requirements. See, e.g., Saudi Arabian Airlines, 2004 DOT
Aviation Lexis 270 (2004); Air Jamaica Ltd., 2004 DOT Aviation Lexis 189 (Mar. 8,
2004).
345 49 U.S.C. § 41302 (2004).
346 49 U.S.C. § 41304 (2004).
347 14 C.F.R., pt. 119. (2001).
348 CASA, supra note 185.
349 Id. § 605.
350 Chicago Convention Annex 11, supra note 164.
351 CASA, supra note 185, at § 607(a).
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Director is authorized to issue certificates to airports and establish
minimum safety standards for their operation.352 An airport
certificate shall be issued when, after investigation, it is
determined that the applicant "is properly and adequately equipped
and able to conduct a safe operation in accordance with [CASA]
and the rules, regulations, and standards promulgated
thereunder." '353 In the United States, the FAA provides air
navigation and air traffic control services. 4
J. Transportation of Dangerous Goods
Annex 18 details the requirements for "The Safe Transport of
Dangerous Goods by Air." '355 Under the CASA, the transportation
of dangerous goods must conform explicitly to the requirements of
Annex 18.356 This is the only place in which CASA expressly
refers to an Annex.357 Civil and criminal penalties may be
imposed for their violation.358
In the United States, the transportation of hazardous material is
subjected to comprehensive regulation.359  The Associate
Administrator for Hazardous Material Safety, in the DOT's
Research and Special Programs Administration, has jurisdiction
over the transportation of dangerous goods by air.36' The
regulations incorporate the ICAO Technical Instruction by
reference.361
K. Penalties for Noncompliance
The requirements established in the CASA, together with the
352 Id. § 607(b)(1).
353 Id. § 607(b)(2).
354 DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION, supra note 23, §§ 12.48-12.50.
355 International Standards and Recommended Practices: The Safe Transport of
Dangerous Goods by Air, International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Annex 18 (1st ed. 1983).
356 CASA, supra note 185, § 608(e); Id.
357 CASA, supra note 185, § 608.
358 Id. §§ 701(f), 702(1).
359 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-27 (2003).
360 49 C.F.R. pts. 171-80 (2001). DEMPSEY ET AL., Aviation Law & Regulation,
supra, note 23, §§ 12.53-12.57.
361 49C.F.R. pt. 171.11 (2001)
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orders issued and rules and regulation promulgated thereunder
may be enforced in the domestic courts.362 The Director may
establish and impose civil penalties for the violation of the CAA
or any rules, regulations, or orders issued thereunder.363 The
number of penalties imposed in any case shall be governed by the
"nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation
committed and.., the degree of culpability, history of prior
offences, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do
business, and such other matters as justice may require.""
Aircraft may be subject to the imposition of liens for penalty
payment3 65 and, if necessary, seizure.
3 66
Under the CASA, criminal penalties, including imprisonment,
may be imposed upon any person who knowingly forges,
counterfeits, or alters a certificate, or knowingly uses a fraudulent
certificate.3 67  Fines may be imposed upon anyone who fails to
keep or preserve, or mutilates, alters, or even fails to keep or
preserve reports, records , and accounts in the manner prescribed.
This includes the filing of false reports or records.3 68 Fines and
imprisonment may be imposed upon anyone who refuses to testify
or produce records in response to a subpoena issued by the
Director3 69 or anyone who removes any part of a civil aircraft
involved in an accident or any property aboard said aircraft.37 °
Fines and imprisonment may be imposed upon one who
intentionally interferes with air navigation by interfering with, or
establishing a false, light or signal.37" ' Fines and imprisonment may
also be imposed for the conveyance of false information.37 Fines
may be imposed upon anyone who interferes with an aircraft crew
362 CASA, supra note 185, at § 807.
363 Id. § 701(a). Penalties shall be adjusted for inflation periodically. Id. § 701(d).
364 Id. § 701(c).
365 Id. § 701(e).
366 Id. § 808(b).
367 Id. § 702(a).
368 Id. § 702(c).
369 Id. § 702(d).
370 Id. § 702(k).
371 Id. § 702(b).
372 Id. § 7020).
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member in the performance of his responsibilities while in flight3 73
or interferes with aircraft operations.3 74 Fines and imprisonment
may be imposed upon anyone who "assaults, intimidates, or
threatens" any flight crewmember, including flight attendants and
stewards. More serious penalties are prescribed for any such act
involving the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon.3 75 Possession
of a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon, or placement of a
bomb or other explosive or incendiary device, aboard an aircraft,
or an attempt thereto, shall result in fines and imprisonment.376
Where the act results in the death of another person, imprisonment
for life may be imposed upon one who commits or attempts to
commit aircraft piracy.377
In the U.S., The FAA Administrator has been given
comprehensive licensing378 and enforcement responsibilities.37 9 A
certificate may be modified, amended, suspended, or revoked in
the interest of safety.38 ° Civil381 and criminal382 penalties may be
imposed by the FAA Administrator in an administrative
adjudication.383 The FAA Administrator may bring a civil action
in federal court seeking judicial enforcement of a regulation or the
terms of a certificate.384
373 Id. § 702(f)(1).
374 Id. § 702(i).
375 Id. § 702(f)(2).
376 Id. § 702(h)(1). An explicit exception exists for law enforcement officers under
certain circumstances. Id. § 702(h)(3).
377 Id. § 702(e)(1). Jurisdiction may exist even if the aircraft is not in flight at the
time the act or aerial piracy was committed, so long as the aircraft would have been in
the jurisdiction of the state seeking to exercise it had the act of piracy been completed.
Id.
378 49 U.S.C. § 44702 (2004).
379 49 U.S.C. § 106 (2004).
380 49 U.S.C. §§ 44709, 44710 (2004); DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW &
REGULATION, supra note 23, § 12.06.
381 49 U.S.C. § 1155(a) (2004); DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION,
supra note 23, § 12.62.
382 49 U.S.C. § 1155(b) (2004); DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION,
supra note 23, § 12.65.
383 49 U.S.C. § 46301 et seq. (2004); 14 C.F.R § 13.11 (2004); DEMPSEY ET AL.,
AVIATION LAW & REGULATION, supra note 23, § 12.05.
384 49 U.S.C. § 46106 (2004).
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V. The Theoretical Paradigm of Compliance with and
Enforcement of International Law
Nations generally comply with most of their international
obligations in the commercial arena.385 Some do so out of a desire
to enjoy reciprocal benefits.386 Since international treaties are
concluded on the basis of consent, most nations find compliance in
their self-interest. 387 Where they have had a role in the process of
law-making, and where they perceive the process to have been
fair, nations are more likely to abide by their internal oblitations.388
Voluntary compliance with international legal obligations is
sometimes obtained by virtue of the moral force of the rule.389
If the substantive law is deemed fair and just and reflective of
widely accepted norms of conduct, it will receive more
universal acceptance.390 Other nations comply out of enlightened
385 Under a "managerial model," Abram and Antonia Chayes embrace a cooperative
problem-solving approach as preferable to the enforcement model of compliances. They
contend that the willingness of states to comply with principles of international law is
attributable to three factors: (1) compliance reduces transactions costs by avoiding the
need to recalculate the costs and benefits of a decision; (2) treaties are consent-based
instruments that serve the interests of the participating states; and, (3) a general norm of
compliance advances State compliance in any particular instance. ABRAM CHAYES &
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995).
386 HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 283 (3d ed. 1960).
387 John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International
Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 147 (1996); John K.
Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory:
The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State
Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1, 123 (1997).
388 Thomas Franck has advanced "legitimacy theory" as an explanation for
compliance with international law - the notion that states will obey rules they perceive to
have "come into being in accordance with the right process." Thomas M. Franck,
Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 706 (1988).
389 Franck insists the principal reason that states comply with international law is the
perceived fairness of the rules. Id.
390 Some observers contend that state compliance with international law depends
upon its perceived legitimacy, which in turn depends on the process by which created, its
consistency with generally accepted norms, and its perceived fairness and transparency.
Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42
STAN. L. REV. 811,833 (1990). According to Professor Hathaway,
The fairness model, like the managerial model, thus points not to state
calculations of self-interest as the source of state decisions to act consistently
with international legal obligations, but instead to the perceived fairness of the
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self-interest in preserving stability, order, and predictability in an
increasingly interdependent global economy."' Still others weigh
the benefits of compliance against the costs of non-compliance,
including the retaliatory conduct of other states.
Under the Chicago Convention, SARPs may be adopted by
two-thirds of the ICAO Council, which is itself comprised of only
thirty-six member states.392 Thus, twenty-four member states -
less than 13% the 188-member ICAO Assembly - can promulgate
a SARP.39 3 Other states are given the right to participate in the
Council's deliberations,394 though relatively few actually do.395
But, ICAO's process includes providing draft SARPs to all
member states, inviting their comments and objections, and
legal obligations. Compliance with international law, in this view, is traced to
the widespread normative acceptance of international rules, which in turn
reflects the consistency of the rules with widely held values and the legitimacy
of the rulemaking process.
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L. J.
1935, 1958 (2002).
391 See generally ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
LAW 127-140 (1982) (discussing rationales behind compliance with international
laws, treaties, and agreements).
392 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 50(a). Originally, the ICAO Council
had 21 members. Id. With the growth of ICAO membership, and the fact that the Council
is the dominant body within the agency, the Convention has been amended on several
occasions to increase the size of the Council. Id.
393 Id. arts. 54(1), 90(a), 94. In the ICAO Assembly, each state has one vote. Id. art.
48(b). However, the 25-member European Union tends to vote as a bloc, effectively
giving Europe 25 votes. Id.
394 Id. art. 53.
395 Former ICAO Legal Advisor Michael Milde observes:
The leadership of the advanced States asserts itself convincingly in the
elaboration of the international Standards while many other States are relegated
to the position of onlookers hardly able to openly oppose the 'motherhood'
initiatives aimed at enhancement of aviation safety and hardly ready to
implement them. The result is a continuing, creeping stagnation in the process
of law-making in ICAO. While on the surface the evolution of the Standards
continues, fewer States (as percentage of the total membership) participate in
the relevant meetings, fewer States send timely substantive comments on the
proposed amendments to Annexes and, worst of all, only very few States
communicate to ICAO whether they are in fact in compliance with the new
Standards ....
Milde, supra note 2, at 7.
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attempting to achieve consensus.396 In practice, SARPs are
adopted unanimously by the Council.397
Some have been troubled by the process of law-making by
elites; 398 however, one must also recognize that the Chicago
Convention includes an "opt-out" process whereby individual
states can refuse to adopt an Annex they find impracticable.399
Theoretically, a majority of states could effectively veto a SARP,
though this has never occurred.400  The Assembly also has the
power to amend the Chicago Convention4 1 and to elect the
Council members. 4 2  Thus, representative democracy is at play.
Moreover, proposed SARPs are widely circulated for comment,
not only to member states, but also to regional and industry
organizations, in an attempt to achieve consensus before the
Council formally votes. The process is both time-consuming, and
may sometimes result in less stringent obligations than if the
Council were unilaterally to promulgate SARPs without input and
consensus-building.
Institutions like ICAO not only promulgate standards
governing national behavior, but they also are participatory
institutions in which members are given an opportunity to debate
the relevant issues of the day.40 3 Their members are educated by
396 Id.
397 Id.
398 See Peter Ateh-Afac Fossungu, The ICAO Assembly: The Most Unsupreme of
Supreme Organs in the United Nations System: A Critical Analysis of Assembly Sessions,
26 TRANSP. L.J. 1 (1998).
399 Id.
400 Id.
401 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 94. The Convention has only rarely
been amended, however.
402 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 49(b).
403 Institutionalist theory is among the most prominent of international relations
theories. It begins with the recognition of the anarchic nature of the international system,
and posits that institutions can improve the likelihood of cooperation. Institutionalists
believe institutions can promote cooperation even in the absence of a common
government or other formal governance structure by providing "a stable environment for
mutually beneficial decision-making as they guide and constrain behavior." William J.
Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 227, 235-245 (1997) (quoting Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and




ICAO on how to comply, and encouraged regularly to comply.40 4
Hence, institutionalism itself - the existence of an organization
with a well defined mission and focused agenda - can facilitate
compliance with international legal obligations.4 5 Ideally, an
international organization can channel conflict so as to permit
settlement with minimal disruption.4 6 It is important that the
leaders of an international organization provide leadership so that
its essential purposes and mission are fulfilled.4 °7
The U.S. model CASA and draft aviation regulations stand on
a different footing from the SARPs.40 8 Although, in essence, the
CASA embraces the most important requirements established by
the SARPs, no nation other than the U.S. participated in the
drafting of the model statute.40 9 Some nations will, nonetheless,
adopt CASA purely on administrative efficiency grounds. It is
simpler, quicker and easier to use the model statute as a template
for a developing nation's aviation laws and regulations than
drafting such legal material from scratch. Economists characterize
it as an effort to reduce transactions costs. 410  Other nations will
respond politically and reject the CASA model outright because of
the identity of its author.41' The CASA largely follows the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958.412 Ostensibly, some nations will be more









410 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure As Catalysts
for Political Change: The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect
Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1988). Aceves argues that "transaction costs
affect all contractual arrangements, including the development and operation of
international institutions." William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International
Law: Transaction Cost Economics and The Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 995, 1003 (1996) [hereinafter Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International
Law].
411 Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law, supra note 410, at 1004.
412 CASA, supra note 185.
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Looking beyond the legislative process, however, when
examining the substantive law, it is clear that the Annexes address
technical issues of aviation navigation and safety in a relatively
objective and neutral way.4"3 These issues themselves tend not to
be politically contentious.414 Therefore, one would rate them
highly for fairness. The achievement of aviation safety is clearly in
the self-interest of all nations.415 The Annexes are also drafted in a
way to encourage their adoption into each contracting state's
domestic law.416 Hence, on these grounds, one would anticipate a
high degree of compliance. 17
There are also instances of compliance inspired by the desire
to avoid the costs of noncompliance such as, for example, the
adverse publicity and negative world opinion to which the
uncooperative nation may be subjected if it is perceived as a
delinquent. 8  Rational, self-interested states 419 comply with
international obligations because of a concern for both the adverse
reputational impacts and direct sanctions that might be triggered
by violations of law.42° Even absent an explicit threat of sanctions,
413 Chicago Convention, supra, note 10.
414 Technical issues of aviation navigation and safety can be contentious, such as
during the height of the Cold War, a Soviet Sukhov military aircraft shot down Korean
Airlines flight 007.
415 Chicago Convention, supra note 10.
416 Id.
417 Rules should be fashioned with a view to assuring compliance with them, so that
the enforcement issue is never reached. ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981). See generally David S. Ardia, Does The Emperor Have No
Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws Protecting the Marine Environment, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 497 (1998).
418 Dr. Milde observes that "enforcement need not be perceived as a 'policing' or
punitive measure; full transparency and publicity of the relevant facts may create
pressure of the public opinion prompting a corrective action by the government
concerned with ICAO assistance." Milde, supra note 2, at 15.
419 Rational choice theory posits that, "individuals engage in purposive, means-ends
calculation in order to attain their goals - that is, they select actions so as to maximize
their utility." Alexander Thompson, Applying Rational Choice Theory to International
Law: The Promise and Pitfalls, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 287 (2002). Some scholars have
applied game theory to the issue of compliance with international legal obligations. See,
e.g., Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 BUFF.
L. REV. 679, 705 (2003).
420 Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1823 (2002). Neorealists maintain international law has little or no impact on
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the mere possibility of reciprocal noncompliance or retaliation
often has a prophylactic effect dissuading delinquency.42'
Exposing the wrongdoer may lead others to isolate or punish until
delinquency is remedied.422
Initially the United States, and then ICAO, monitored state
compliance with the SARPs.423  The U.S. published the report
cards issued by the ICAO. The economic impact was immediately
felt by the airlines and tourism industries of the failing nations.424
If it isn't safe to fly somewhere, or on some airline, passengers
will vote with their feet, so to speak, and travel elsewhere. Hence,
efforts by the U.S., and more recently ICAO, are important
measures to expose delinquencies and thereby encourage
compliance.
What if states still do not comply with their international
obligations? The fundamental problem of enforcement of
international legal obligations is that there is nothing comparable
to the domestic courts and their police enforcement mechanism at
the international level.425  Domestically, nations usually play the
state behavior, and that compliance with international law can be explained as accidental
coincidence between international law - whose content is defined by powerful states -
and national self-interest. Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The
Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193
(1980).
421 DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra note 23,
at 312. The impact upon a state arising from its loss of reputation as a result of violating
legal obligations may be sufficiently significant to deter delinquency. Aceves,
Institutionalist Theory, supra note 403, at 254.
422 Aceves, Institutionalist Theory, supra note 403, at 251-52.
If rule violations cannot be effectively identified, the incentives to
transgress from such rules are significant. Like the Law Merchant of
medieval Europe, there must be a mechanism that paints the scarlet
letter of noncompliance on rule violators.... [I]f parties are
provided with adequate information regarding rule violations, there
may be no need for formal sanctioning mechanisms to ensure
cooperation. Compliance can be gained through decentralized
punishment by informed parties.
Id.
423 Chicago Convention, supra note 10.
424 Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law, supra note 410, at 1034.
425 William Reisman, The Role of Economic Agencies in the Enforcement of
International Judgments and Awards: A Functional Approach, 19 INT'L ORG. 921, 932
(1965). Nevertheless, the absence of a formal sheriff or his equivalent at the
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paternalistic role of maintaining law, order, and domestic
tranquility within their borders; but internationally, their conduct
has been likened to that of "primitives, warring [tribes], juvenile
delinquents, or other uncivilized groups." '426 The conceptual
domestic model of courts and sheriffs which efficiently determine
legal rights and obligations and execute judgments is inappropriate
in the community of nations, where authority and power are
dispersed among numerous actors, and the legal system is
essentially primitive in nature.427  A nation which seeks
implementation of its legal rights in the international arena cannot
rely upon some higher authority to enforce them.42
Yet that does not mean that international law is
unenforceable.42 9 A state seeking to force another state to comply
international level does not mean that there is no public order system of law. Id. Indeed,
while it is difficult to organize the consensual coercive and retaliatory mechanisms of
compliance and enforcement into a conceptual framework, there nevertheless exists "an
international public order system and it is sustained by a complex web of sanction
expectations of varying degrees of intensity." Id.
426 Lauri McGinley, Ordering a Savage Society: A Study of International Disputes
and a Proposal for Achieving Their Peaceful Resolution, 25 HARV. INT'L L. J. 43, 47
(1984). Hans Morgenthau has written of international law, "there can be no more
primitive and no weaker system of law enforcement than this, for it delivers the
enforcement of the law to the vicissitudes of the distribution of power between the
violator of the law and the victim of the violation." HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS
AMONG NATIONS 312 (6th ed. 1985). According to Morgenthau, "[iut is an essential
characteristic of international society, composed of sovereign states, which by definition
are the supreme legal authorities within their respective territories, that no such central
lawgiving and law-enforcing authority can exist there." Id. at 296.
427 McGinley, supra note 426, at 46; Reisman, supra note 425, at 932; WILLIAM
REISMAN, SANCTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 282 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971).
428 DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION, supra note 23, at 312.
429 As Professor Zoller observes:
[T]he main difference between internal and international society lies in the fact
that in the latter physical coercion is not organized and has never been
transferred to a state system. In other words, the law is not enforced by an
officer. This does not mean, however, that it is not enforced at all. It is
therefore misleading to believe that international law is not "guaranteed law" on
the ground that there is no enforcing authority above the state. International law
is indeed guaranteed mainly by self-interest without the help of a specialized
enforcing agency.
ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF
COUNTERMEASURES xii-xiii (1984).
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with its international legal obligations may, instead, rely on
various means of "self-help" remedies, including coercion.43 °
From the earliest early days of "classic international law,"
and its expression in the writings of Hugo Grotius and other
scholars, to contemporary international legal system,
coercion and reprisals have played a fundamental role in
nation-state dispute resolution.431
430 The use of reprisals has been historically justified on the basis of compelling
another state to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a dispute created by its own
international delinquency. Oscar Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial
and Arbitral Decision, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1960). Reprisals are admissible not only,
as some writers maintain, in case of denial or delay of justice or other ill-treatment of
foreign citizens prohibited by international law but in all other cases of an international
delinquency for which the injured state cannot get reparation through negotiations, or
other amicable means, be it noncompliance with treaty obligations or any other
internationally illegal act. Id. Professor Schachter noted that "in the absence of a system
of community enforcement, international law has traditionally sanctioned coercive
measures by the successful party as "self-help" to compel the recalcitrant party to carry
out the judicial decision or arbitral award imposing obligations upon it." Id. See also
JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 90 (1954). Whilst the use
of force by one state against another state to obtain execution is now generally regarded
as illegal, there appears to be no bar to a creditor state taking diplomatic measures or
employing economic sanctions to obtain satisfaction. J.L. SIMPSON & HAZEL Fox,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 264, 268 (1959). See also BURLEIGH CUSHING RODICK,
THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55-57 (1928).
431 See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (7th ed.
1952). See also L. PFANKUCHEN, A DOCUMENTARY TEXTBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
637 (1940); and JOHN BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS (6th ed. 1963). There is a notable
difference, however, in the way international law is viewed and enforced today in
contrast to the pre-World War I era:
Prior to the development of modern international law, the principle
of complete national sovereignty dominated international relations,
such that nations were free to act autonomously or independently of
other States, with an exclusive right to judge the lawfulness of their
own conduct. For purposes of this analysis, the period coinciding
with the term "modern international law" is used to refer to the post-
World War I era, which expressed the explicit denunciation of the
use of force. The Covenant of the League of Nations clearly forbids
the use of force by nations, and subsequent international conventions
and treaties explicitly limited the nature of state sovereignty vis-A-vis
a state's responsibility to other nations in the international
community. Inevitably, conflicting economic and political
objectives resulted in conflict and confrontation. However, there
was no alternative but to accept forceful aggression, violent coercion
and retaliation as legitimate instruments of dispute resolution. Until
the strongly worded prohibition on violent coercion of Article 2(4) of
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Some commentators have posed the question of whether the
use of economic coercive means may be deemed illicit when
directed against a nation for purposes of achieving political
ends.432 The fundamental rights of nations are founded upon the
idea of natural equality, a residuum of the state of nature existing
among human groups before their entry into the collective body
politic.433 Yet, the very efficacy of international law is, itself,
jeopardized in the absence of effective sanctions by which its
requirements can be enforced.4 34 Hence, there should be standards
by which one assesses the legitimacy of coercion. In assessing the
lawfulness of economic reprisals,435 one source identified three
the Charter of the United Nations, the use of force was the common
means of obtaining redress and ensuring enforcement in the
international legal order.
DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra note
23, at 319.
432 J. Depray Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 187,
192 (1974). See also Derek Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA.
J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1972). As this author noted elsewhere: "[i]t does appear desirable... in
an efficient system of world public order, that forms of coercive activity which might be
unnecessarily or unreasonably destructive to the essential values of an innocent target
State, or which might significantly endanger international peace and security, be
effectively regulated or even prohibited." Paul Stephen Dempsey, Economic Coercion
and Self-Defense in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and Alternative American
Responses Thereto, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 253, 261 (1977) [hereinafter Dempsey,
Economic Coercion and Self-Defense in International Law]. See generally James
Boorman, Economic Coercion in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and the
Ensuing Judicial Issues, 9 J. INT'L & ECON. 205 (1974) (analyzing the demand and need
for oil as a device whereby other nations may be coerced into compliance).
433 See, e.g., BRIERLY, supra note 431. See also CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY
AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (P. Corbett trans., 1957).
434 Dempsey, Compliance and Enforcement in International Law, supra note 3, at
560.
435 Coercive enforcement mechanisms which classic international law designated as
"reprisals" derived from the acts of withholding, taking or destroying any form of
property of a foreign state or its nationals. ZOLLER, supra, note 429, at 37. They could be
carried out for a variety of reasons: as a show of strength in foreign policy, to punish
another state for any action judged to be reprehensible, or in warfare to compel an enemy
to respect certain basic rules and to punish it for not having respected them. Id. The
premise or theory behind early public reprisals was that the international system must be
based on a just and equal social order. Id. A breach of law always disrupts that order and
is likely to lead to injustice among nations. Id. Justice rests upon a foundation of equality
of nations. Id. Should this equality be distorted by a breach of law, justice calls for its
reestablishment. Id. Thus, the injured state has the natural right to retaliate in order to
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succinct requirements:
I. A prior international delinquency against the claimant state;
2. Redress by other means must be either exhausted or unavailable;
and
3. The economic measures must be limited to the necessities of the
case and proportionate to the wrong.436
In the British Caledonian case, the court held that the United
restore equality, or to punish in order to return the "status quo ante." Id. The early
scholars and philosophers of international law found violent reprisals to be permissible
and necessary tools of law enforcement. Id.
According to Grotius, the law of nations has two components: thejus natural or natural
law of nations, which is a secularized law of nature, and thejus gentium or voluntary law
of nations. The natural law of nations is based on reason; the voluntary law is based on
will, i.e., the consent of states. See R. BRYANT, A WORLD RULE OF LAW, A WAY TO
PEACE 38 (1977). Referring to nation-state conflict, Grotius saw peace as the only
worthy end for which war should be waged. In his conclusion, he claims that man must
never resort to simple barbarism but must fight only to enforce principles of justice
which spring from man's rational nature. Grotius developed the concept of "Just War;"
that is, that international law determines the principal cases of resort to war, such as
punishment of a state which violates the basic principles of international law. See JULIUS
STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 14 (2d ed. 1959). DEMPSEY,
LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra note 23, at 319. In addition,
Grotius argued that war could be legitimately waged and hostages taken as security for
the fulfillment of a treaty. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS Ch. XX § LIII.
Grotius argued that law without sanctions would fail. Thus, Grotius recognized the
permissibility of reprisals and sanctions used to enforce international obligations. Id.
A later critic of Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694), stressed that the availability
of overwhelming coercive force is the most effective means to encourage lawful
behavior of states. For example, Pufendorf argued, "[t]hose who cannot be brought to a
better way of life by reason, can be kept in order only by terror." SAMUEL VON
PUFENDORF, VII THE LAW OF NATIONS BOOK § 11 (1672).
Emerich de Vattell (1714-1767), in his THE LAW OF NATIONS, espoused the right of
reprisal even more strongly than either Grotius or Pufendorf. Thus, from the 16th to the
mid-I 8th centuries, an effort was made to construct a conceptual legal framework around
the use of armed might as a legitimate means of enforcing standards of international
behavior. See B. FERENZ, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).
436 Derek Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,
9-10 (1972) [citations omitted]. This author has taken a similar position: "[a]
determination that the predominant purpose of the acting state was to cause an
illegitimate deprivation or destruction of values of the target state, rather than a virtuous
attainment of ends (that is, maximization of legitimate values) might be considered as
prima facie ... evidence of illegality." Dempsey, Economic Coercion and Self Defense
in International Law, supra note 432, at 261-62; see also DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN
POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra note 23, at 330.
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States may not unilaterally suspend foreign-flag airlines unless the
states in which they have registered have not abided by their
obligations under the Chicago Convention and it Annexes.437
Otherwise, the U.S. is obligated to accept that State's certificate of
airworthiness.438
As for the exhaustion of alternative remedies, the "open skies"
bilateral air transport agreements lay out a process of notification
and consultation prior to suspension.139  Failing a negotiated
settlement, the United States can file a formal complaint with the
ICAO Council for adjudication under Article 84 of the Chicago
Convention.44 ° In the six decades since its promulgation, the
ICAO Council has exhibited no enthusiasm for adjudicating
disputes and, in fact, has never reached the merits on any
adjudication, though it has successfully used its "good offices" to
help resolve several.441
Finally, regarding proportionality, the prohibition of an unsafe
aircraft from one's airspace or the suspension of service to and
from an unsafe airport, appears tailored to the wrong and designed
to secure a precise, and proportionate, remedy."2 The imposition
of sanctions is designed to cause sufficient economic stress on the
delinquent state's airlines and its economy so that it sees the utility
of complying with the SARPs. 443 The ultimate remedy, of course,
is compliance, whether compliance is achieved through
enthusiastic endorsement of the principles codified in the
international rule, or through reluctant and grudging acquiescence
to achieve relief from real or potential coercion."4
Still some nations do not comply because, quite frankly, they
cannot. 4 5 Some nations are simply too poor to adequately fund
437 British Caledonian Airways v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
438 Id.
439 DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra note 23,
at 330.
440 Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 84.








their aviation ministries, to hire technically competent inspectors
and regulators, or to invest in airport and air navigation
infrastructure.446 Some nations simply lack the financial or human
resources to comply.447 This is where the developed world needs
to help the developing world, in providing grants, loans and
technical assistance to facilitate compliance . 4 8  No level of
coercion can compel a nation to do something it cannot.44' The
IFFAS program is a step in the right direction. 5° So too, is the
development of regional air transport organizations that pool
resources and share expertise to facilitate regional compliance.45" '
VI. Conclusion
Like a constitution, the Chicago Convention created a quasi-
legislative body, ICAG. The Convention gave ICAO the power to
fill in the details by promulgating requirements, and giving
contracting states, the responsibility to implement them.452  For
decades, ICAO successfully promulgated standards, fulfilling the
first part of the mandate.453 But many contracting states ignored
their responsibilities to fulfill the second part of that mandate, and
promulgate domestic laws implementing their international
obligations.454 For many years ICAO blithely turned a blind eye to
such delinquency. 455 The fundamental objective of achieving
uniformity in international aviation safety and navigation - an area
where uniformity is manifestly desirable - was thwarted for many
years.
The story of the development of uniform international rules
governing aviation safety by the relevant international





450 See Saba, supra, note 7 at 537; Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Funding an International
Financial Facility for International Safety, 28 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 1 (2002).
451 See Abeyratne, supra note 1, at 133; Barreto, supra note 134, at 672-75.
452 Chicago Convention, supra note 10.
453 Abeyratne, supra note 450, at 5.
454 Id.
455 Milde, supra note 2, at 16.
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and then gradually implemented, can serve as a useful case study
of how compliance is pragmatically achieved in international law:
through encouragement, persuasion, assistance, investigation,
publicity, and, if all else fails, reprisals. The interplay between
recalcitrant states and economically powerful states determined to
investigate, expose, and sanction delinquency, is the classic
conflict between a powerful state determined to exert its will over
a weaker state. Here, that dynamic prompted target states to ask
the relevant international organization (ICAO) to exert its
authority in monitoring and facilitating compliance - in effect, to
fulfill its constitutional mandate under the Chicago Convention to
achieve safety in international aviation by creating uniform
standards adopted universally. Consensus was achieved that
ICAO oversight was needed, and highly preferable to the
unilateral monitoring and sanctions imposed by a single powerful
nation like the United States. Global compliance with international
regulations is more universally accepted when mandates are a
product of an international organization, rather than products of a
single, albeit powerful, nation.
As a consequence, ICAO, today, is a much more effective
organization than it was a decade or two ago, and the Chicago
Convention's goal of achieving uniformity in international
aviation safety and navigation is becoming more universally
achieved. This is a development in the traveling public's best
interest. The interplay between unilateral and multilateral
enforcement roles revealed here offers useful lessons which can
help facilitate the success of global governance in other contexts.
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